The main legal point established in the judgment is that the reliefs mentioned in Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code are not mutually exclusive, and a scheme for the management of a temple may necessitate incidents not explicitly provided in the section.

1. This is an appeal against the decree in a suit filed for the removal of the defendants-appellants from the trusteeship of the plaint temple and for the framing of a scheme. The lower Court has ordered the removal of the trustees and framed a scheme. Objection is now taken mainly on the ground that the suit is bad as not being in accordance with the sanction granted to . the plaintiffs by the Collector. In that sanction the Collector granted permission to oust the present trustees by filing a scheme suit. The contention for the appellants is that, under Ss. 92 and 93, Civil P. C., under which sections this sanction was granted, the various reliefs mentioned in Section 92 are mutually exclusive, and that when a suit is filed for any one of these reliefs there must be specific sanction to that effect. The logical effect of this argument is that if sanction is given under Clause (g) for settling a scheme no orders could be passed by the Court directing accounts in the future or declaring what portion of the trust property shall be allocated to any particular object, or authorizing any part of the trust property to be let, etc. But in a scheme for the management of a temple these are almost necessary incidents, and certainly proper incidents, in the management thereof; consequently it cannot be held that all these reliefs are mutually exclusive when there is no provision to that effect in the section. In the present case sanction was given to file a scheme suit, namely a suit to settle a scheme for the proper management of the plaint temple. In framing such a scheme a Court must undoubtedly provide for some one to manage the institution, and in so doing would be appointing a trustee under Cla. (b) to Section 92. The appointment of a new trustee is the chief ground of the appellants complaint, for he cannot contend that sanction was not granted for the removal of the defendants themselves. Such a complaint, as shown above, has no force The only prayer in that suit, to which exception can be taken, is that which asks the trustees to render an account of their management, but that prayer was withdrawn and has not been granted.

2. Mr. Venkatarama Aiyar argued that that withdrawal is not sufficient to cure the defect, but that the suit should have been dismissed in toto, and relies on several cases in support of this proposision. The first one is Srinivasa v. Venkata [1888] 11 Mad. 148 where it was held that when a sanction had included a claim for damages against the trustees, and such a claim had been omitted in the plaint, the suit was not within the terms of the sanction. In Venkatesha v. Ramaya Heqade [1915] 38 Mad. 1192 where a sanction had been granted to two persons and one alone sued, it was held that the suit was bad; and similarly in Bhagavanarayana v. V. Perumalacharyulu [1915] 29 M. L. J. 231 where two plaintiffs sued out of four to whom sanction had been granted. The principle underlying all these cases is that where it appeared to the Court that, if the plaint, as presented in Court, had been before the authority granting the sanction, and it was possible that the sanction would not have been accorded to such a plaint, that plaint was bad. Here the facts are quite different The suit is in accordance with the sanction, but an additional prayer which has not been sanctioned has been added and subsequently removed. Several similar cases have been cited, and we may refer to Syed Hussain v. Collector of Kaira [1897] 21 Bom. 257 Niza-mul-Haq v. Muhammad Oshak [1919] 50 P. W. R. 1919 and appeal No. 373 of 1924 of this Court. In all these cases it was held, not that the suit was bad, but that the extra reliefs sought for could not be granted, but the other prayers were allowed. In the present case the lower Court has already disallowed the extra relief and, therefore its decree is correct.

3. On the merits, of the case it was sought to be argued that the plaint property was the archaka service inam of the defendants and