The main legal point established in the judgment is that for a reunion to take place in a joint Hindu family, the parties must have divided the family property with each other.

Devadoss, J.

1. The only point for consideration in this second appeal is whether plaintiff 1, Sarvayya, is entitled to the estate of Subbayya by right of survivorship. There were three brothers, Mangayya, Subbayya and Seshayya. They divided their properties in 1894. Seshayya was then a minor. He attained majority in 1896 and died in 1897. His widow adopted plaintiff 1, the only son of Subbayya. Subbayya is now dead. Sarvayya, plaintiff 1, claims the estate of Subbayya by right of survivorship. He put forward three contentions in the District Munsifs Court.

2. 1. That he was a Dwamushyayana son of both Subbayya and Seshayya.

3. 2. That at the partition of 1894 Mangayya, separated from the family, and Subbayya and Seshayya, continued to be members of joint Hindu family and 3. That he and Subbayya entered into an agreement whereby they both became members of a joint Hindu family. All the three points were found against plaintiff 1 by the District Munsif. On appeal the Subordinate Judge agreed with the District Munsif in finding the points 1 and 2 against plaintiff 1, but he held that he had reunited with Subbayya and therefore he was entitled to succeed to Subbayyas estate. Defendant 3 has preferred this second appeal.

4. It is contended by Mr. Lakshamanna for the appellant that there could be no reunion between persons who were not parties to a division. In other words a reunion can only be among persons who were once joint and who had been divided. In Balabux v. Rukhmabai [1903] 30 Cal. 725 their Lordships of the Privy Council lay down the principle in the following terms:

A reunion in estate properly so called can only take place between persons who were parties to the original partition. This appears to be the meaning placed on the well-known text of Brihaspathi in Mitakshara Chap. 2, Section 9. He who being once separated dwells again through affection with his father, brother, or paternal uncle, is termed reunited.

5. The text of Yagnyavalkya is a reunited brother shall keep the share of his reunited co-heir who was deceased or shall deliver it to a son subsequently born. Setlurs Hindu Law Books on Inheritance page. 57).

6. Vignaneswara in commenting upon this text observes the effects which had been divided and which are again mixed together are termed .reunited. He to whom such appertain is a reunited parcener Re-union cannot take place with any person whoever it be but only with a father, a brother, or a paternal uncle as Brihaspathi declares. He who being once sep rated lives again through affection with his father, brother, or paternal uncle is said to be reunited.

7. The literal interpretation of the text can lead to no other conclusion than that a person in order to become reunited with another must have divided the family property with the other. We are not concerned in this case with the question whether the persons enumerated by Brihaspathi, the father, brother, or paternal uncle, exhaust the list of persons who could become re united. The only question in this is whether a person who had not divided the inheritance with a father, brother or uncle can become reunited with any of them. It is admitted that the plaintiff was born only in 1896 and that he was not a party to the partition in 1894.

8. In Basantha Kumar Singha v. Jogendra Nath Singha [1906] 33 Cal. 371 it was assumed that a reunion could only be among persons who had become divided.

9. In Akshay Chandra Bhattacharya v. Haridas Goswami [1908] 35 Cal. 721 Mr. Justice Mitra observes:- Reunion Sanskrit word being Samrishta--implies a state of union or jointness, a partition and subsequent state of jointness amongst coparceners by mutual consent and through affection.

10. The word used in the text is Samrishta.

11. In Viswanath Gangadhar v. Krishnaji Ganesh 3 B. H. C. A. C. 69 it was held that a reunion must be made by the parties or some of them who made the separation,.

12. It may be said that this decision was under Mayukha Law and therefore is no authority on