The main legal point established in the judgment is that the court has the authority to extend the time for payment of the purchase money, even if the application for enlargement of time is made after the expiry of the period allowed by the decree, based on the interpretation of Section 35, Act I of 1877 and the authority established in the case of Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Rahiman Sahib and its subsequent applications in other cases.

Jackson, J.

1. The petitioner seeks to revise the order of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Masulipatam, in C.M.P. No. 299 of 1925.

2. The petitioner was defendant in O.S. No. 308 of 1922 brought by counter-petitioner, the plaintiff, for specific performance of a contract to sell immoveable property. It was decreed against the petitioner that, on counter-petitioner depositing Rs. 300 in three weeks from the date of the decree, the petitioner should execute a sale-deed and put counter-petitioner in possession of the property (Appeal No. 39 of 1923, Additional Subordinate Judge, Masulipatam). The counter-petitioner did not deposit the amount within three weeks and applied after the expiry of that period for extension of time. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge extended the time accordingly and hence this revision petition.

3. There is clear authority that in suits under the Specific Relief Act where the decree has named as here a time within which payment should be made the Court can extend that period. See Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Rahiman Sahib.(1922) I.L.R. 46 M. 148 : 44 M.L.J. 107

4. It would hardly avail the petitioner in these proceedings to contend that there is equal authority to the contrary. This is not a second appeal and if the Lower Court has applied its mind to the question of law and has followed authority, it cannot be said to have acted illegally or with material irregularity.

5. The only possible contention is that Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Rahiman Sahib (1922) I.L.R. 46 M. 148 : 44 M.L.J. 107 is so wrong as to be no authority at all. In that case the learned Judges point out that according to English practice a decree for specific relief is not regarded as closed and that the same rule obtains in India is clear from the Act itself. Section 35, Act I of 1877, lays down that the Court may rescind the contract if the purchaser has obtained possession of the property and has made default in payment of the purchase money. Obviously default in payment has not ipso facto rescinded the decree. The time fixed may be taken as a general indication of what is reasonable and is not an absolute condition.

6. This with all respect lays down an eminently sensible rule of procedure (as the Chief Justice observes the contrary view would seem to be absurd) and there is no ruling really to the contrary. In a suit not for specific relief but for recovery of certain property it was held in Moideen Kuppai v. Ponnuswami Filial (1914) 1 L.W. 882 that a Court cannot modify its decree either under Section 148 or under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, which seems to be a salutary rule, but here the question is not one of modification but of interpretation. In Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Rahiman Sahib (1922) I.L.R. 46 M. 148 : 44 M.L.J. 107 it is held that the decree as it stands admits of the extension of time and there is no necessity to alter it (page 155). In Gopala Aiyar v. Sannasi (1915) 3 L.W. 29 a single Judge applied Moideen Kuppai v. Ponnusmmi Pillai (1915) 3 L.W. 29 to a decree under the Specific Relief Act. Ramaswami Kone v. Sundwa Kone (1907) I.L.R. 31 M. 28 : 17 M.L.J. 495 which was also applied, merely lays down that a confirming appellate decree does not enlarge the time. These rulings are fully discussed in Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Rahiman Sahib (1922) I.L.R. 46 M. 148 : 44 M.L.J. 107 and Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Rahiman Sahib (1922) I.L.R. 46 M. 148 : 44 M.L.J. 107 has been followed in Rama Bhatlu v. Annayya Bhatlu. (1925) 49 M.L.J. 152

7. The only circumstance which distinguishes the present case is that here the application for extension was made after the expiry of the period, but as the learned Additional Subordinate Judge correctly observes once it is held that time is not essential, it is immaterial whether the application be made before or after the expiry. Whether it has been made within reasonable time is a question of fact to be determined in each case. The learned Judge has found that t