The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of Section 70 of the Contract Act, emphasizing the wider scope of the section, lawful payments made for no unlawful purpose, and the benefit enjoyed by the recipients.

Phillips Offg. C.J.

1. In this case the plaintiffs seek to recover from defendants 1 and 2 or in the alternative defendants 3 and 4 certain moneys paid by the firm of plaintiff 1 and defendants 5 and 6 to the firm of A.P.S. in Rangoon on behalf of the firm of defendants 1 and 2. The Subordinate Judge has found that defendants 1 and 2 were indebted to the firm of A.P.S., Rangoon, and that the firm of plaintiff 1 and defendants 5 and 6 called K.R.S.V. did actually pay moneys to A.P.S. firm on behalf of defendants 1 and 2. The plaintiff made a claim in the alternative against defendants 3 and 4 who constitute the A.P.S. firm, but subsequently withdrew that claim. The Subordinate Judge has found that although the plaintiff made these payments they do not come within the provisions of Section 70, Contract Act, on the ground that the plaintiffs were not individuals who were interested in making the payments and the payments, therefore, will not be lawful within the meaning of Section 70, Contract Act. The learned Judge appears to have confused Section 69 with Section 70. In Section 70 there is no reference to a person being interested in making the payment and it has been held by this Court from Damodera Mudaliar v. Secretary of State [1895] 18 Mad. 88 onwards, that Section 70 does not reproduce English law but has a wider scope. That case related to the execution of repairs to a tank by Government, the zamindar having also an interest in the lands under the tank. The Court held that the Government is entitled ,;to recover part of the cost proportionate to the benefit received by the Zamindar. The learned Judges did not purport to define the word "lawfully" which occurs in Section 70 but they treated the section as having a wider scope in accordance with its wording and held that its scope was not restricted so as to conform to the rules of English law. They also held that it would not include the officious interference of one man with the affairs or property of another and it is now argued that this exception applies to the facts of the present case. Again in Venkatakrishnamacharlu v. Arunachala Pillai [1919] M.W.N. 244, Justice Abdur Rahim held that the meaning of the word "lawfully" in Section 70 was merely bona fide and he based this view on the judgment of Ayling, J., in Saptharishi Reddiar v. Secretary of State [1915] M.W.N. 256. On reading Justice Aylings judgment in that case it would appear that Justice Abdur Rahim has to some extent limited the definition of the former Judge, who interprets "lawful" as meaning "not unlawful" which is a very wide interpretation indeed. With all respects I would adopt Abdur Rahim Js interpretation as being a very good definition of the word unlawful but I must not be understood to mean that there may not be cases where this definition would not be applicable.

2. The facts of the present ease are that the plaintiff 1 and defendants 5 and 6 are brothers and members of the firm of K.R.S.V. They are uncles of defendants 1 and 2 who constitute the firm of M.N.V. and admittedly plaintiff 1, who lives in India near defendants 1 and 2, was advising their mother and guardian in the management of their business. Can it be said that a firm consisting of the uncles of defendants 1 and 2 one of whom was supervising the business of defendants 1 and 2 interfered officiously in discharging the debts due by the nephews to others? Undoubtedly, if plaintiff 1 made the payment, he could not be said to be acting officiously, for he was actually helping defendants 1 and 2 in the management of their business; and in the absence of evidence to the contrary he must be considered to have acted bona fide in their interests. It is contended by Mr. Padmanabha Aiyangar that inasmuch as the payment was made by the younger brother, defendant 6, it was an officious interference. It is argued that defendant 6 made the payment originally on behalf of the S.A.S. firm, but of that there is no evidence and we must take it