A decree based on a compromise requires scrutiny of the validity and binding nature of the contract, especially when one party is a major. The actual age of the minor and related unresolved issues must be determined in such cases.

1. This second appeal has arisen from a suit which was instituted by two plaintiffs for a declaration that a decree passed against them in Original Suit No. 461 of 1918 on the file of the District Munsif s Court at Parvathipur was not binding on them and also for possession of the property which under that decree appears to have been obtained by the first defendant in this litigation who was the decree-holder in the previous suit. In the District Munsifs Court the plaintiffs suit was dismissed, but in the lower Appellate Court the learned Subordinate Judge, having arrived at the finding that the first plaintiff at least was a major on the date of the compromise on which the decree was passed, held that the decree was not binding on both the plaintiffs and, therefore, granted a decree in favour of both the plaintiffs declaring that the previous decree was not binding on them and also for delivery of possession of the property. It has been argued by the learned Vakil for the appellant before us that even on the ground on which the lower Appellate Court held that the previous decree was not binding on the plaintiffs, namely, that the first plaintiff at least was a major, the lower Appellate Court was wrong in considering that a decree passed against persons who are on the record as minors in the belief that they continued up to the time of the decree as minors would not be binding on them. For this purpose the learned Vakil for the appellant referred to the decision of Sadasiva Ayyar and Napier, JJ., in the case of Seshagiri Rao v. Hanumantha Rao 32 Ind. Cas. 391 : 39 M. 1031 : 19 M.L.T. 93. In that case the learned Judges have clearly pointed out that there are no provisions in the Civil Procedure Code relating to suits by and against minors obliging a plaintiff to apply for discharge of the guardian ad litem of a defendant who had ceased to be a minor. There are provisions in the civil Procedure Code for a minor plaintiff on attaining majority electing to go on or not to go on with a litigation. That is obviously in view of the fact that the plaintiff is in a position to elect either to go on or not to go on with a litigation to which he is a party because he is dominus litus. No such consideration is available in respect of the defendant. A defendant having been made a party defendant to the action may no doubt confess judgment but has no such right of election as the plaintiff has. That is probably the reason why no provisions have been made in the Civil Procedure Code in respect of a minor defendant attaining majority. Apparently, therefore, we must take it, as found by the learned Judges in that case, that the minor defendant who comes of age may, if he thinks fit, come on the record and conduct the defense himself. If, however, he does not do so and allows the case to proceed as though he was still a minor without bringing to the notice of the Court the fact of his having attained majority, then he must be deemed to have elected to abide by the judgment or adjudication by the Court with respect to the matters in controversy on the basis of the suit at the time. That is how the learned Judges came to the conclusion in that case that a judgment given by a competent Court against a defendant albeit a defendant who had during the pendency of the suit attained majority having ceased to be a minor, is not a nullity. That view is based on sound principle. But the difficulty in this case has arisen from a contention that was put forward by Mr. Jagannatha Dass on behalf of the respondent who drew our attention to the judgment of the same learned Judges on an application for review made to them in that very case. The judgment on review by the learned Judges is reported in Seshagiri Rao v. Tangaturi Jagnnadham 37 lnd. Cas. 387 : 20 M.L.T. 479. At first sight it appeared as though on this decision the learned Judges came to the conclusion that because they discovered that the application to set aside the sale of the property s