The main legal point established in the judgment is the proper application of the Court-fees Act, specifically Section 7 (iv) (a), in determining the jurisdiction and valuation of a suit for cancellation of a document securing property.

Venkatasubba Rao, J.

1. This petition raises a question relating to Court-fee as well as jurisdiction. The point in regard to Court-fee having been decided by the lower Court in favour of the plaintiffs, the reason for my interfering in revision is, that its decision is wrong on the question of jurisdiction: see the judgment in Kattiya Pillai v. Ramaswami Pillai A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 396.

2. The plaintiffs allege in their plaint that their father entered into a partnership with defendants 1 to 3 which was to remain in force till 1931, that, after their fathers death in 1925, their mother agreed with the said defendants to release the plaintiffs rights in the partnership and executed a release deed, dated 10th April 1926. After plaintiff 1 attained majority in 1927, this suit was filed for obtaining a declaration that the release deed is not binding upon the plaintiffs. They allege that the deed was brought about by fraud and undue influence and that their rights are not affected by the release deed. The plaintiffs pray for a declaration that it is invalid and. for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their participation in the business of the partnership. The lower Court has held that the suit falls within Section 7 (iv) (c), Court-fees Act, which relates to a suit,

to obtain a declaratory decree or order where consequential relief is prayed

3. If this section applied, the plaintiffs would be at liberty to value the relief at any amount fixed by them. In this case, they valued the relief at Us. 2,100 and filed the suit in the Court of the District Munsif.

4. The question to be decided is: are the plaintiffs bound to get the release deed set aside? If they are, the form of the plaint may be disregarded, for, in substance, the relief claimed is one for can collation. The transaction was entered into by the mother of the plaintiffs as their guardian. Can it be said that such a transaction is an absolute nullity? In my opinion, Article ii. Dim. Act, clearly applies. I am not now concerned with cases which have held, that in the case of alienations by managing members of a Hindu coparcenary it is unnecessary to get the transaction set aside. The case relied upon by the lower Court: Veeraraghavulu v. Sreeramulu A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 816, is a case of this description. In the present case, I am not called upon to consider whether this decision is correct or not. The alienation in question was made by the mother of the plaintiffs, their guardian under the Hindu law. In such a case the transaction is voidable and not void. Then again, the question does not arise whether Article 44 does or does not apply to an alienation by an unauthorized person. In this case, the complaint in short is that an authorized guardian effected an unauthorized transfer. An alienation by a guardian mu3t be regularly set aside: see Madugula Latchiah v. Mukkalinga [1907] 39 Mad. 393; Muthukumara Chetty v. Anthony Udayan [1915] 38 Mad. 867; Kandasami v. Irusappa [1918] 41 Mad. 102 and Arumugham Pillai v. Ambalam A.I.R.

192. Mad. 425. I am therefore disposed to read the plaint as if contains a prayer for the cancellation of the release deed. In this view, the section of the Court fees Act applicable is Section 7 (iv) (a). It reads thus:

In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value or other document securing money or other property having such value, according to the value of the subject-matter of the suit.

5. The words " securing money or other property " are not happy; but the question is: Is this or not a suit for cancellation of a document securing property having money value? I think it clearly is. I have no doubt that the release deed in question is a document securing property; in other words, by that document, the property covered by it is made secure to the defendants. Can there be any doubt that a sale-deed comes within the terms of this section? The present instrument does not materially differ