The judgment emphasizes the application of statutory provisions related to appeal to the Privy Council, res judicata, and the criteria for a fit case for appeal.

Venkatasubba Rao, J.

1. The defendants apply for a certificate of leave to appeal to the King in Council. One of the questions raised in the suit was, whether the village in which the suit lands are situate, is an estate or not within the meaning of the Estates Land Act, It was inter alia contended for the defence that the village in question is an unsettled jaghir under Section 3 (2) (c). We have held that the grant was not a jaghir grant but an inam grant which falls within Sub-clause (d). We have further held that under the exception to Section 8. the inamdar acquired the kudivaram interest and the plots in question have, therefore, ceased to be parts of an estate. The contention of the defendants that they are entitled to occupancy rights has also been rejected.

2. The judgment of this Court is a con-firming judgment. The plaintiff sought to recover in the suit, possession of three gidangadis or betel plots known as Veerapan, Kadapetham and Baker gidangadis. The learned District Judge disallowed the plaintiffs claim in so far as it relates to the first plot on the ground that the suit was premature. He passed a decree in respect of the second and third plots. We confirmed the judgment of the lower Court in its entirety. The defendants desire to prefer an appeal to the Privy Council. So far as Kadapetham is concerned, it was not even argued for the defence that the decision of the lower Court was wrong and, giving effect to a plea of res judicata, we held. that the defendants were bound to deliver up possession of that plot. Then remains the only other item, Baker gidangadi, which alone can form the subject-matter of appeal to the Privy Council. It is admitted that its value is far below Rs. 10,000. Para. 1, Section 110, has, therefore, clearly no application.

3. Then comes the question: can the petitioners rely upon para. 2? It refers to cases where the decree involves directly or indirectly some claim or question to or respecting property of the requisite value. To what kind of cases this paragraph applies, is indicated in the following passage, in the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Radhakrishna v. Sundaraswamier A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 257, at p. 481 (of 45 Mad.) In the first place, the sum of money actually at stake may not represent the true value. The proceeding may, in many oases, such as a suit for an instalment of rent or under a contract, raise the entire question of the contract relations between the parties and that question may, settled one way or the other, affect a much greater value, and its determination may govern rights and liabilities of a value beyond the limit; Banarsi Prasad v. Kashi Krishna Narain [1900] 28 All. 227. The Courts below may accordingly with propriety, as was done in this case, make the necessary certificate.

4. It is alleged that there are other cases pending between the same parties, relating to similar holdings in the suit village and that the total value of the lands concerned is upwards of Rs. 10,000. Prima facie then, this paragraph applies; but a certain circumstance excludes its application. It is not disputed that these various suits were filed, unlike the present suit, in the District Munsifs Court. In a previous case between the same parties reported in Sam v. Ramalinga Mudaliar [1917] 40 Mad. 664 it was held that the grant in question was not a jaghir grant, and that the decision operates as res judicata between the parties. This is the view taken by the District Munsif in the suits to which I have referred and the correctness of that view cannot be disputed. In these circumstances, it is futile for the defence to urge that there are other suits pending (it is true appeals are pending against the Munsifs decisions) which relate to lands which are of the requisite value. How can the decree in this case affect in these circumstances any question respecting property, the subject-matter of the other suits? It is no longer open to the defence to raise in those suits the plea t