The judgment established the principle that a party can acquire an easement to rest their roof upon a wall based on long-standing use, independent of statutory limitations.

1. The plaintiff is the appellant in this appeal. The plaintiff and defendant 1 are the owners of the adjoining premises, the plain-tiffs premises being to the west of: defendant 1s. A wall running north to the south separates the plaintiffs from the defendants, and the same belongs to defendant 1. The roof of the plaintiffs house has been resting on this wall. The defendant tried to pull down that wall, and the plaintiff instituted the suit which gave rise to this appeal for a declaration of his right to have the roof of his house rested on the wall and for an injunction to restrain the defendant from doing anything which would interfere with the right of support which the plaintiff claims. The learned District Judge of South Malabar recorded the following finding:

I agree with the findings of the learned District Munsif that both the wall and the house (plaintiffs house) are old and the roof must have rested on this wall for more than 20 years...it is not necessary for a person claiming an easement specifically to prove that there was no permission from the owner. It is sufficient if he proves user for more than 20 years. I find that the plaintiff has acquired an easement to rest his roof upon the wall in question.

2. He accordingly granted an injunction preventing the defendant from in any way interfering with the plaintiffs easement right to rest his roof upon the plaint wall, and that so long as the defendant does not interfere with the plaintiffs roof, the defendant will be at liberty to alter or re-construct the wall as much as ho pleases.

3. Defendant 1 (who is the owner of the wall and is the only contesting defendant) preferred a second appeal to the High Court, and a learned Judge of this Court, being of opinion that the District Judge had not considered all the evidence in the case, called for fresh findings which were submitted by another District Judge and on receipt of the same reversed the District Judges decision and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal.

4. It is clear that the roof of the plaintiffs house must have been resting on the wall in question for more than 20 years. In the findings submitted by the second District Judge this is what he says:

The plaintiffs house is so old that the. second witness, aged about 48 years, who was living in the house to the east of it could not say when it was constructed. The roof on that side must have been resting on that wall ever since the house was built.

5. This is what really the District Munsif as well as the District Judge found in their judgments, for the first District Judge had already observed in his judgment as follows:

I agree with the finding of the learned District Munsif that both the wall and. the house are old and the roof must have rested on this wall for more than 20 years.

6. The question for consideration is whether on such a finding the plaintiff is entitled to the right of support for his roof on the defendants wall. We will assume for this purpose that the plaintiffs joint, family took a lease of the defendants, premises including the suit wall in 1914 from defendant 1, and that by virtue of the decree in suit No. 401 of 1917, defendant 1 got back possession of the same in execution of that decree; but that does not disentitle the plaintiff to have the right, of support claimed by him declared in this suit, if it be proved that the plaintiffs house enjoyed that right ever since it was built and for much more than 20 years. As observed by Sadasiva Ayyar, J., in Muthu Goundan v. Anantha Goundan [1916] 29 M.L.J. 685:

Section 15, Easements Act, does not interfere with other titles and modes of acquisitions and therefore where a party proves that he has been enjoying a right of way for a long series of years, he acquires a right thereto independently of the statute and the limitation prescribed by Section 15 would have no application to such a case.

7. The decision of the Privy Council in the case reported in Rajr