The main legal point established in the judgment is the limited scope of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, which applies only to improvements on agricultural holdings and vacant building sites, and does not extend to roadside porambokes in urban areas.

Anantakrishna Aiyar, J.

1. On the 12th March, 1923, the District Board of Malabar passed proceedings permitting the President of the District Board to lease a particular roadside poramboke vested in the District Board for occupation by the present defendant. The proceedings made it a condition for allowing such temporary occupation that the applicant should pay a sum of Rs. 6 a year and that he should deliver back possession of the plot without claiming any compensation for improvements of any sort that he might make on the property. On such conditions the President, District Board, Malabar, leased to the defendant the roadside poramboke on the 4th April, 1923, as per Ex. A. Subsequently, as it was resolved to take possession of the property, a notice to quit, Ex. B, was served upon the defendant on the 7th May, 1925, requiring him to quit the premises and deliver possession to the District Board. The defendant not having done so, the President, District Board, Malabar, has instituted the suit which has given rise to this Second Appeal to recover possession of the property. The main plea of the defendant was that he was entitled to be paid the value of the improvements effected by him on the property before surrendering possession, and he relied on the provisions of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act. The District Munsif of Badagara, who tried the suit, was of opinion that the provisions of the Crown Grants Act (XV of 1895) applied to the case and accordingly came to the conclusion that the rights of the parties should be adjudicated according to the tenor of the document. The document being specific on the point that the defendant should not claim the value of any improvements that he might make on the property, the District Munsif came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not bound to pay anything in respect of the improvements. The defendant preferred an appeal to the Lower Appellate Court and the learned District Judge of North Malabar differed from the District Munsif as regards the applicability of the Crown Grants Act to the case in question. He, however, was of opinion that Malabar Act (I of 1900) did not apply to the present case, because the present case related to a road margin in the heart of Badagara bazaar, by the side of the principal public offices and at the junction of three roads, and he was accordingly of opinion that the land in question could not be said to be an agricultural holding within the meaning of the Malabar Act. The learned District Judge also relied on a decision of this Court reported in Chathukutty v. Runhappu (1927) I.L.R. 50 M. 813: 53 M.LJ. 224 where the learned Judge, Jackson, J., held that Malabar Act (I of 1900) applies only to improvements effected to agricultural holdings and vacant kudiyiruppu building sites. The learned District Judge was of opinion that the roadside poramboke in question which was leased to the appellant could not be said to be an agricultural holding or a building site (kudiyiruppu) available for purposes of being built upon. It was roadside poramboke proper, and as the same was not required immediately for any purpose by the District Board, it was thought that it may be leased to the defendant temporarily, but on the specific terms and conditions mentioned in the lease. The learned District Judge (Mr. A.V. Govinda Menon) observed as follows in paragraph 2 of his judgment:

It would be a perversion of common sense to hold that when, as here, in an urban area like Badagara, a tenant agrees to occupy a road margin for a short term and agrees with the District Board (in which the road is vested) to go away whenever called upon, without claiming anything for any fixture he might erect upon the site, such a contract comes within the mischief attempted to be struck at by the Improvements Act.

2. The defendant has preferred this Second Appeal and on his behalf it was argued by his learned Advocate that the decision of this Court referred to by