The judgment established the principle that the delay in applying for amendment may not be disentitling in certain circumstances, and that the court has jurisdiction to amend the decree to bring it in accordance with the judgment.

Ananthakrishna Ayyar, J.

1. This is an application for amendment of the decree passed in Second Appeal No. 1568 of 1923 by the late learned Chief Justice. The second appeal was disposed of on 24th March 1926 and it was dismissed with costs. The appellants in the second appeal were defendants 2, 3 and 4. The original suit was for recovering possession of certain properties with past profits, Rs. 60 and future profits at the rate of Rs. 60 per year.

2. The first Court dismissed the suit on the merits. On plaintiffs appeal to the District Court of Chingleput, the District Judge reversed the District Munsifs decree and on 20th November 1922 gave judgment in favour of the plaintiffs. Para. 20 of the lower appellate Courts judgment is relevant to the points that I am now considering:

Therefore 1 reverse both decrees of the lower Court and in O.S. No. 346 of 1919. I give plaintiff the decree sought for with possession and Rs. 60 mesne profits as deposed to by P.W. 1 and subsequent profits at the same rate till delivery.

3. As I said, the second appeal preferred by the defendants against that decision of the learned District Judge was dismissed by the High Court on 24th March 1926. The decree drawn up in the lower appellate Court gave the plaintiffs possession of land and also Rs. 60 for past mesne profits, but with reference to future mesne profits this is what the decree contained:

That defendants 2 to 4 (respondents) do pay to plaintiffs (appellants) Rs. 60 for past mesne profits and also future mesne profits at Rs. 60 a year from this day till delivery of possession.

4. The discrepancy between the judgment and the decree was not noticed and when the second appeal came on for hearing, this matter was not mentioned to the Court, After the second appeal was disposed of, the plaintiffs decree-holders applied to the lower appellate Court on 16th March 1927 to bring the decree of the lower appellate Court in accordance, with its judgment by mentioning in the lower appellate Courts decree that the plaintiffs were to have mesne profits not from the date of the lower appellate Courts judgment, but from the date of the plaint. The learned District Judge who heard that application held, and I think quite rightly, that after his decree had been confirmed in second appeal by the High Court, the District Court had no longer any jurisdiction to pass any orders amending its decree. The decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Piohuvayyangar v. Seshayyangar [1895] 18 Mad. 214 is clear authority for the position that after the lower appellate Courts decree had been confirmed by the High Court in second appeal, the jurisdiction of the lower appellate Court to amend its decree ceased. The District Judge accordingly dismissed that application with costs on 14th November 1927. The plaintiffs decree-holders subsequently applied to the High Court on 13th February 1928 for having the decree amended and brought in accordance with the judgment. The application came on for orders before the late learned Chief Justice who disposed of the second appeal, and his Lordship directed notice to issue on 15th March 1928 and subsequently on 4th March 1929 when the application came on before him for hearing, he gave the respondents two weeks time for filing a counter. A counter has been filed by the respondents on 15th March 1929. The purport of the counter is that the amount due to the decree-holders under the lower appellate Courts decree had been paid in full and the decree-holder had given a receipt for having received the whole amount due under the decree of the lower appellate Court. Though the receipt has not been filed along with the counter affidavit in this Court, there could not be any dispute as regards the fact that the decree-holders received the full amount due under the decree of the lower appellate Court and granted a receipt to the judgment-debtors to the effect that they had received all amounts due to them under the lower appellate Courts decree.

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