The main legal point established in the judgment is that the power of attorney was not irrevocable and the plaintiff did not have any interest in the property, thus the defendant was entitled to revoke the agency.

Ramesam, J.

1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff against the decree of our brother, Kumaraswami Sastri, J., in C.S. No. 192 of 24 which was a suit brought by the plaintiff for a declaration of his hereditary right to the management of the temple of Sri Vittalnathjee in Ekambareswar Agraharam, Madras, and that the defendant has no right to cancel the power-of-attorney executed by him in favour of the plaintiff and for an injunction. The learned Judge dismissed the suit and the plaintiff appeals.

2. The facts of the case may be thus stated: In the year 1896 one Ganga Bai, widow of the plaintiffs paternal grandfathers brother, built a temple for Sri Vittalnathjee in Ekambareswar Agraharam and in 1900 she executed a Bhot Patra (Ex. A) in which she mentions the fact of her having built the temple in 1896 and got the idols of Sri Vittalnathjee and Sri Swaminijee installed therein and of having set apart a sum of Rs. 40,000 for the seva, puja, utsavams and other festivals of the deities and for the salaries of the temple servants. The sum was left with the plaintiffs father, Krishnadoss Balamukundoss of Giridoss Govindoss Company of Madras and he was to pay monthly a sum of Rs. 200 for the expenses. She then adds another Rs. 5,000 to the original fund of Rs. 40,000. She ways that the above properties, namely, the house in which the temple was built, the above funds and also cloths, jewels and vessels costing about 4,500 were settled upon the deities and were delivered possession of to the Guru of the family, namely, Sri Krishnavati Vahujee of the Udaipur Samasthanam. She also provides that the successors of the Guru should conduct the seva, puja, offerings, festivals etc. of the temple and that the funds should not be used by anybody for any other purposes. In 1904 the said Sri Krishnavati Vahujee, who was made the trustee of the institution under Ex. A, executed a power-of-attorney to Krishnadoss Balamukundoss giving him certain powers for managing the institution, the principal being a person who had to be constantly absent from Madras, namely, in Udaipur Samasthanam. This is Ex. 3. In 1906 Krishnadoss Balamukundoss died and the agency created by Ex. 3 must be taken to have terminated. The plaintiff stepped into his fathers shoes and continued to look after the management of the institution, and in 1909 another power-of-attorney was executed by the same lady, namely, Sri Krishnavati Vahujee, to enable the plaintiff to look after the management of the temple (Ex. 4). In 1911 the principal, namely Sri Krishnavati Vahujee died. Again the contract of agency must be taken to have terminated. But the plaintiff continued to look after the management of the temple. In 1914 the successor of Sri Krishnavati Vahujee namely, her adopted son, Sri Gopeswara Laljee, gave a fresh power-of-attorney to the plaintiff (Ex. 5). To this power-of-attorney a schedule of the properties entrusted to him is attached. Items 1, 2, 3, 4, 8 and 9 therein show that the original funds of Rs. 45,000 were reduced to Rs. 39,000 and odd and both parties have recognized that was the sum then available for the purposes of the trust. The houses are described in items 5 and 6, and jewels and other moveables in items 7 and 10. In 1916 the same Sri Gopeswara Laljee executed another power-of-attorney to the plaintiff (Ex. 2) under which the power-of-attorney of 1914 was cancelled and larger powers were conferred upon the plaintiff. Some time before the suit which was filed in 1924 misunderstandings arose between the plaintiff and the Udipur Guru who is the defendant and the defendant purported to cancel the power-of-attorney, Ex. 2 on 28th February 1924. The present suit was therefore filed by the plaintiff for the reliefs already mentioned in March 1924. The learned trial Judge thought it was unnecessary to take oral evidence. He held that the defendant was entitled to cancel the power-of-attorney, Ex. 2, and that, if the plaintiff could at all complain of it, it was