The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of property law principles including fraud, estoppel, consideration, res judicata, and alienation pendente lite in determining the validity of a mortgage and property rights.

Srinivasa Ayyangar, J.

1. The suit out of which this second appeal has arisen was for sale on a mortgage. The plaintiff was the mortgagee and defendant 1 the mortgagor. Defendant 3 was made a party to the suit on the ground that he claimed ownership in respect of item 2 of the property, the subject-matter of the suit. The plaintiff has been granted a decree in respect of half of item 2 in the suit.

2. The point taken last by the learned vakil for the appellant may first be disposed of. He argued that defendant 3 was not a necessary party at all to the suit upon the mortgage, but he was made a party as a person claiming title to the property in himself and the plaintiff made him a party to the action on the ground that the property which was subject to the mortgage was in his possession. No objection was taken to this course and we cannot possibly accede to the contention that at this stage we should allow this point of misjoinder to be taken for the first time.

3. It was next argued that the decision relating to the fraud on the registration on the ground that item 1 was fraudulently included originally in the suit mortgage Ex. A, merely for the purpose of getting the deed of mortgage registered in a particular registration district, was come to by the lower appellate Court without an opportunity being given to the District Munsifs Court to arrive at a finding thereon. The District Munsif did not give a finding with regard to it because in the view he took of the case, it became unnecessary for him to do so. But the lower appellate Court has gone fully into the matter and affirmatively found against the fraud alleged. We are not satisfied that the finding of the lower appellate Court on this matter is wrong. The lower appellate Court was not bound to remand the case and it was entitled in law to come to any finding of fact by itself.

4. On the main question it was argued by the learned vakil for the appellant that the basis upon which the lower appellate Court proceeded to grant the decree to the plaintiff was wrong, namely, the ground that defendant 3 was estopped from contending that the mortgage in favour of the plaintiff was improper. It is difficult to sustain the judgment of the lower appellate Court on this matter. If the property was admittedly joint family property the mere fact that it comes to be dealt with by one of the members of the family as if it were his own property cannot be relied upon by any person who deals with such purchaser for the purpose of showing that such purchaser can be regarded as ostensible owner of the property. Estoppel can arise only if the owner of the property allows it to be dealt with by the ostensible owner In other words, when the owner holds out some other person as the real owner of the property, he is in law estopped from afterwards disputing whatever that ostensible owner did. If, admittedly, the entire joint family was the owner there was no room for invoking any such estoppel because it was nobodys case that the joint family held out some third party as the owner of the property. But it is clear that, if not on that ground, the judgment of the lower appellate Court cannot be sustained for other reasons.

5. We must take that the finding of the lower appellate Court with regard to Ex. D, the sale-deed in favour of defendant 1, was that it was for consideration. Mr. Watrap Subramania Ayyar for the appellant argued that the finding with regard to the consideration for Ex. D was only involved in the finding of the consideration for Ex. A and that, therefore, the lower appellate Court should be called to find separately. The consideration for the two are separate and it is clear that, according to the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court, the consideration for Ex. D was a certain promise to discharge the debts of the vendor made by defendant 1 and the consideration for Ex. A was a promise to discharge those debts made by the plaintiff to defendant 1. It was however, strenu