The main legal point established in the judgment is that in cases of fraud, the period of limitation for a suit begins to run from the time when the fraud becomes known to the plaintiff, as per the interpretation of Article 120 of the Limitation Act.

William Watkin Phillips, J.

1. This is an appeal against the decree declaring that the mortgage executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant is not binding on the plaintiff who represents the worshippers of the temple to which the mortgaged properties belong. The appeal is argued mainly on the question of limitation which was not raised in the lower Court until the time of arguments. The Subordinate Judge has found that the Article of the limitation applicable is Article 120 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act and that time has to be computed from the date on which the plaintiff becomes aware of the transaction in suit, and, consequently, that it would have been necessary to take further evidence in order to establish the fact that the plaintiff became aware of this transaction more than six years before the suit. It is now argued that this decision is wrong and that the period of limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act runs from the date of the alienation and not from the date of the knowledge of the plaintiff of the transaction. The words in the Article are "when the right to sue accrues." It was held in Ottapurakkal Thazhate Soopi v. Cherichil Pallikkal Up-pathumma 5 Ind. Cas. 698 : 33 M. 31 that when a karnavathi made an alienation which was sought to be set aside by some of the members of the tarwad, the suit was barred as being brought more than six years after the date of the alienation. It does not appear from the report of that case that there was any fraud alleged on the part of the karnavathi and, therefore, this case is perhaps not entirely applicable to the facts of the one we are considering That case, Ottapurakkal Thazhate Soopi v. Cherichil Pallikkal Uppathumma 5 Ind. Cas. 698 : 33 M. 31 was referred to in a subsequent case Prasanna Venkatachella Reddiar v. Collector of Trichinopoly 33 Ind. Cas. 45 : 38 M. 1064 where it was approved by one of the two Judges, whereas, the other one based his decision on the fact that the plaintiff bad knowledge of the transaction more than Six years before the suit. It is argued that the decision in the case is applicable here on the ground that the present suit is not one based on fraud. The plaint, however, shows that the plaintiff alleges a breach of trust and this preach consists in the 1st defendants dealing with properties, as his own, which really belonged to the temple. It is difficult to see how this is not an allegation of fraud on the part of the 1st defendant for the effect of his action, if left undisturbed, would be to deprive the temple of some of its properties and would have given the 2nd defendant the right to bring those properties to sale in case of default as belonging to the 1st defendant personally. This element of fraud in the case, I think, differentiates it from Ottapurakkal Thazhate Soopi v. Cherichil Pallikkal Uppathumma 5 Ind. Cas. 698 : 33 M. 31. There are many subsequent cases in this Court, where, in case of fraud, it has been held that the right to sue accrues under Article 120 of the Limitation Act when the plaintiff becomes aware of the fraud. I may refer to two cases, Muruga Chetty v. Rajaswamy 30 Ind. Cas. 669 : 29 M.L.J. 574 : 2 L.W. 813 : 18 M.L.T. 327 : (1915) M.W.N. 701 and Thirumala Rao v. Kadakar Durgi Shettethe 22 Ind. Cas. 883 : 1 L.W. 134 : (1914) M.W.N. 197. Both these refer to cases of denial of plaintiffs title and it was held that until he was aware of that denial his right to sue did not accrue. It is difficult to distinguish cases of denial of title from one like the present which is in effect a denial by the 1st defendant of the temples title to the property. Again in Venkataswara Aiyar v. Somasundram Chettiar 44 Ind. Cas. 551 : 7 L.W. 280 : (1916) M.W.N. 244, to which I was a party, it was held that, until a creditor became aware of the alienation which he attacked as being in fraud of creditors, his right to sue did not accrue. That, no doubt, was put upon the ground that a creditor has al