The main legal point established in the judgment is the retrospective nature of the Acts and the sufficiency of the signatures for attestation.

Murray Coutts Trotter, Kt., C.J.

1. My brother Odgers and I referred this case to a Full Bench rather from a desire to have an authoritative ruling for the Courts of this Presidency than from any real doubt we had as to the right answers to the questions that we referred.

2. The answers to the questions are as follows:

(1) The Acts are retrospective. We should have thought that Acts XXVII of 1926 and X of 1927 showed a clear intention that they were to be regarded as retrospective, but the terms of Act XII of 1927 preclude further discussion.

(2) The signatures of the Registering Officer and of the identifying witnesses affixed to the registration endorsement are a sufficient attestation within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act and its subsequent amending Acts. The argument against this conclusion was that the signatures were made alio intuitu, to satisfy the requirements of the Registration Act, and cannot therefore be invoked in aid for another purpose, viz., attestation under the Transfer of Property Act though in fact all the conditions laid down by the latter Act are fulfilled. The Registering Officer and the identifying witnesses had exactly the same duty imposed upon them by the Registration Act as would have vested upon them as attesting witnesses under the Transfer of Property Act, and that duty they discharged. We think that this argument is at its best too artificial to prevail, and we agree with Sarada Prasad Tej v. Triguna Charan Ray (1922) I.L.R. 1 Pat. 300 and Radha Mohan Dutta v. Nripendra Nath Nandy (1927) 47 C.L.J. 118 in rejecting it.

(3) As Appeal No. 170 of 1925 has not been reported, it is unnecessary to express any opinion on the correctness of the decision.

Ramesam, J.

3. I agree.

Pakenham Walsh, J.

4. I agree.