1946 Supreme(Mad) 287
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Mr. Justice Wadsworth and Mr. Justice Govindarajachari, XJ.
Chinna Venkata Reddi, minor represented by his guardian and mother Chennamma
Versus
R. Sidda Reddi and others
Appeal No. 147 of 1945.
Decided On : 29 November 1946
The Advocate-General (K. Rajah Aiyar) and D. Narasaraju for Appellant.
Sir A. Krishnaswami Aiyar, N.C. Vijayaraghavachari and N.C. Srinivasan for Respondents.
The appellant, a minor, brought the suit out of which this appeal arises, to reopen a prior partition effected between his father’s branch and three other branches of the family and he also prayed for a declaration that the compromise decree for partition in O.S. No. 66 of 1938 on the file of the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Chittoor, was not binding on him as he was not impleaded in that suit. The appellant was born on the 7th February, 1940. The family to which he belongs consisted originally of two sons of one Chowdi Reddi (one of these sons was the appellant’s great grandfather, Sidda Reddi). The other son was Thimma Reddi, who had three sons, each of whom is now represented by his descendants. We are therefore concerned with a family consisting of four branches, that to which the plaintiff belongs being entitled under the ordinary Hindu Law, to a half share in all the properties. It was, however, alleged that the properties of the family had been largely increased by the efforts of the other branches and that consequently they had been recognised as having a claim to more than their ordinary shares in the property.
The first agreement with which we are concerned is Ex. D-1 dated 12th September, 1929, under which the representatives of the four branches agreed to divide the properties in four equal shares. The actual writer of this agreement was the appellant’s uncle who is the first defendant in the suit. On 19th September, 1932, there was a reference to arbitration executed by the representatives of the four branches for a division on the basis of the agreement, Ex. D-1. But it does not appear that this arbitration was effective. In 1933 there was a suit filed by certain agnates of the family, who claimed a half share in the family lands. In this suit, the appellant’s father and uncle filed a written statement in which they recited that they had received Rs. 8,500 from the common funds and had agreed to take one-fourth share in the first of the properties. That suit was settled and we are not now concerned with the claim of those agnates. At the end of 1934, the four branches met together and divided all the moveables of the family and also the houses. There was no actual division by metes and bounds of the lands, except, possibly, of certain items about which there is varying evidence. But it seems to have been established,-and has, in fact, been conceded by Mr. D. Narasaraju, Advocate for the appellant-that from 1935 onwards, the income of all the lands was enjoyed in four equal shares by the four branches and each branch paid one fourth of the kist of the lands.
On 25th May, 1936, the representatives of the four branches executed an agreement, Ex. D-3, which recites the previous division of the moveables and the failure to divide the lands and refers to arbitration the division of all the lands into four equal shares, the parties agreeing to abide by the decision. In 1938, the plaintiff’s father and uncle filed O.S. No. 66 of 1938 against the members of the other three branches, in which they claimed that their branch was entitled to the sole right in certain Reddi inam lands and to a half share in the rest of the lands of the family. This suit was contested and, in the end, there was an arbitration, as a result of which the plaintiff’s branch was given the sole right in certain lands and the rest of the lands were to be divided in four equal shares. The date of this award was 11th June, 1939. The suit itself was actually compromised on a slightly different basis, the appellant’s branch being given two more items of property not included in the award. This compromise decree was passed on 9th March, 1940, just over a month after the birth of the appellant who was not impleaded in the suit.
The position, therefore, is that at the time of the appellant’s birth all the branches had bound themselves by an agreement to divide the rest of the properties in four equal shares, the appellant’s branch having been given