Mr. K.R. Venkatarama Ayyar, a leading advocate of Madura, was engaged by the Zamindar of Sivagiri to defend O.S. No. 3 of 1928, on the file of the Sub-Court, Tinnevelly, in which the Zamindar was the defendant. Ex. P.3 is a memo regarding settlement of fees at Rs. 2,800 and it is dated 18th November, 1935. This sum was made up in the following manner: Rs. 500 was balance due up to that date, Rs. 800 was the balance due in respect of a fee of Rs. 1,500 settled for filing a legal representative petition and Rs. 1,500 was the amount then settled for conducting the case from that day till its final disposal, inclusive of the fees for commission enquiry, if any, which may be held at Madras. When the advocate claimed Rs. 3,222 as due to him, a reply was sent to him by the Dewan (Exhibit D-1) on 9th September, 1936, pointing out that that only Rs. 2,000 was due. The advocate wrote to the Dewan Exhibit D-2 on 13th September, 1936, that he had heard from the junior vakil that a compromise had been effected in the suit and that a compromise memo was going to be filed in Court and the fact that he was not consulted about it was of no concern to him, so long as the amount due to him was paid. So he asked for a telegraphic remittance of Rs. 2,100. Exhibit P-4 is a letter from the Dewan dated 30th March, 1937, intimating to the advocate that the Zamindar promised to pay up the arrears in the last week of April.

When the estate went under the management of the Court of Wards, the advocate preferred a claim before the Collector of Tinnevelly on 25th June, 1941, for Rs. 2,100+ Rs. 222+ Rs. 272+ Rs. 254 and interest. The Collector referred to the Subordinate Judge, Tinnevelly the question whether the claim for Rs. 2,000 was in time and not barred by limitation. In making the reference he expressed the opinion that the claim was barred. The Subordinate Judge upheld the Collector’s view. On appeal by the advocate, the Subordinate Judge’s decision was confirmed. This second appeal has been preferred by the advocate and the only question is whether the claim for Rs. 2,000 fees due to the advocate is within time.

Reluctantly do I feel compelled to uphold the view taken by the lower Courts; I say reluctantly because I may confess frankly that I do not expect institutions like the Court of Wards to raise pleas of limitation in bar of suits filed for recovery of fees due to advocates who appear for the estate or estates in their charge. This, however has nothing to do with the decision of the question of law involved in the case. Article 113 has nothing to do with the question. A suit for the recovery of money due for work done cannot be regarded as a suit for specific performance of a contract. For the same reason, Article 115 has no application as there is nothing like compensation for the breach of any contract. Before we go to Article-120 we must see whether there is not any other Article which will apply. Article 84. is clearly applicable and the only question is, what is the date from which the three years period commences to run. It was urged for the appellant that as execution proceedings in the suit are still pending the suit cannot be said to have terminated. For certain purposes no doubt the word “suit” may include execution proceedings, as well as an appeal also. But this meaning cannot be imported into Article 84 where the word “suit” seems to be used in its ordinary non-technical sense in which a layman would understand it. Moreover, under section 2 of the Act, “suit” does not include an appeal or an application. Hearn v. Bapu Saju Naikin1, Sadashiv Ganpatrao v. Vithaldas Nanchand2 and Gulam Mohideen Sahib v. Md. Oomer Sahib3 were cited for the appellant; but they seem to have no bearing. In the first case, it was held that the suit did not terminate by a compromise which was entered into between the parties without the knowledge of the solicitor and which was not made through, or certified to the Court which passed the decree. Th