These are petitions to quash proceedings instituted against the petitioners for offences alleged to have been committed in contravention of Rules and Ordinances made under the Defence of India Act. Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar appears for the petitioners in Crl. M.P. No. 1569 of 1946 in which the prosecution was instituted under rule 18-B, sub-clause 1(b) of the Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order of 1945. The main argument has been addressed to us on this petition. Mr. V.V. Srinivasa Aiyangar appears for the petitioners in the other petitions. They relate to prosecutions under different orders, but no separate argument has been addressed to us in respect of these petitions and it is admitted that the same considerations will apply to all the petitions. It has seemed to us, convenient, therefore, to refer throughout to the Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order only on the footing that what applies to this order will apply equally to the orders in question in the other petitions. The Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order was made under sub-rule (2) of rule 81 of the rules made under the Defence of India Act. Section 1(4) of the Defence of India Act provides that the Act ‘"shall be in force during the continuance of the present war and for a period of six months thereafter.“By an Order in Council of the 20th March, 1946-the India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946-the end cf the emergency-i.e., the war-was declared to be the 1st of April, 1946; and on the 1st day of April, 1946, the Governor-General by proclamation revoked the proclamation made under sub-section (1) of section 102 of the Government of India Act on the 3rd of September, 1939. Hence the Defence of India Act and the Rules and Ordinances made under it ceased to be in force from the 30th September, 1946. In all the petitions before us the offences alleged were committed and the prosecutions were instituted before the 30th of September, 1946. Notwithstanding this, the case for the petitioners is that the prosecutions cannot be continued because, after the expiration of a statute, in the absence of provision to the contrary, no proceedings can be taken on it, and proceedings already commenced ipso facto determine.

On the 30th March, 1946, the Governor-General promulgated Ordinance No. XII of 1946. This Ordinance is entitled the”Defence of India (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1946. Section 2(2) of the Ordinance commences:

“Amendment of section 1, Act XXV of 1939.-To sub-section (4) of section 1 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, the following shall be added, namely: ‘but its expiry under the operation of this sub-section shall not affect-‘”

and then substantially repeats in four clauses (a) to (d)-the provisions of clauses (b) to (e) of section 6 of the General Clauses Act regarding the effect of the repeal of an enactment. Clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Ordinance provides that the expiry of the Defence of India Act shall not affect:

“any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid;

any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Act had not expired.”

If Ordinance XII of 1946 is valid, it is clear that the petitioners have no case and that the proceedings against them can be lawfully continued.

Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, however, argues that, at any rate in so far as it purports to affect prosecutions instituted under the Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order of 1945, the Ordinance is ultra vires the Governor-General and so not valid. This argument is based on the fact that the subjects to which the Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order applies are subjects included in the Provincial Legislative List, i.e., list 2 in Schedule VII of the Government of India Act. Section 72 of Schedule IX of the Governmen