This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the tespondents for the taking of partnership accounts. Valliappa Chettiar, the deceased father of the first respondent and Alagappa Chetty, the deceased father of the first appellant, carried on business as money-lenders and bankers at Theinzig in Burma under the name and style of “R.M.P.”. Alagappa died in 1925, but his sons took his place in the partnership and continued the business. On the 23rd May, 1927, Valliappa also died and as his only son, the first respondent, was a minor at the time, Alagappa’s sons, the first appellant and the deceased father of the third appellant, were left in sole management of the business and its assets. Though the first respondent attained majority in 1936 as he is deaf and dumb and mentally defective the present suit was brought in 1939 by one Ramanathan Chettiar his next friend and his deceased brother’s widow who has adopted the second respondent. Various pleas were raised in answer to the suit in the written statement filed by the appellants who alleged, inter alia, that the business was not continued after the death of Valliappa but was wound up, only such acts of management as were necessary for winding up being done with the assent and approval of Venkatachalam Chetty who was administering the estate of Valliappa as the executor of his will, and that such assent and approval would bind the respondent. Numerous issues were framed in the suit and the Court below finding many of them for the respondents passed a preliminary decree on the 21st December, 1942, declaring the proportionate shares of the parties in the partnership and directing certain accounts to be taken by a Commissioner to be appointed for the purpose.

Issues 7 to 14 were, however, reserved for consideration “at the time of passing the final decree.” Among these undetermined issues were the following:

“(8) From what date is the plaintiff entitled to claim accounts?

(9) Whether the defendants have utilised the assets, advantages and facilities of the suit firm as alleged by the plaintiffs, and whether, for that reason, defendants are liable and to what extent .

(10) Whether the defendants carried on business of the suit firm after the death of Valliappa Chettiar or whether the firm was only being wound up by them?

(11) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to interest and if so, at what rate?

(12-a) Whether the acts of the defendants are validated by the assent and concurrence of Venkatachalam Chettiar, the second plaintiff, and the first plaintiff’s mother as alleged by the defendants.

(12-b) Whether the acts of the said Venkatachalam Chettiar in respect of the suit firm are valid and binding on the plaintiffs and whether the defendants are precluded from raising this plea by reason of the decision in O.S. No. 38 of 1935.”

It is, however, obvious that these issues had an important bearing on the accounts to be taken, and the Subordinate Judge fell into an error in directing the Commissioner to take accounts without determining these issues. As might have been expected in such circumstances, the report submitted by the Commissioner was found to be defective and unsatisfactory, and the Court, after hearing the objections of the parties to the report and recording its finding on the said issues and also on certain charges formulated by the respondents on the statement of accounts filed by the appellants, passed an order on the 20th August, 1946, directing the Commissioner to take accounts afresh and submit a revised report in the light of the directions contained in the order within the time fixed therein. The respondents applied for duly certified copies of “judgment and decree” on the 22nd August, 1946, but seeing that, while printing charges were required to be deposited for the judgment, no stamp papers for a copy of the “decree” were called for, they applied on the 8th October, 1946, for a copy of the “decree.” The application was, however, returned with an endorse