The Chief Justice.-Until 1936 a grant by a landholder of land constituted an estate within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, only if it was a grant of the melwaram and in favour of a person who was not the owner of the kudiwaram. The Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, made an important alteration in the law. It provided that if the grant was of a whole village, the land comprised in it would constitute an estate. It did not matter whether it was a grant of both the warams or of only one waram, nor did it matter who was the owner of the kudiwaram. In Ademma v. Satyadhyana Thirtha Swamivaru1 a Division Bench, of which one of us was a member, held that a grant could not be regarded as a grant of the whole village when there were already minor inams and a portion of the village had been reserved by the landlord. The decision was followed in other cases. This resulted in the Legislature amending the Act further. By the Madras Estates Land (Amendment) Act, 1945, an explanation was added to sub-section (d) of clause (2) of section 3 of the Act and numbered Explanation (1). It reads as follows:

“Where a grant as an inam is expressed to be of a named village the area which forms the subject-matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purposes.”

It was provided that the amendment should be deemed to have had effect from the 31st October, 1936, the date on which the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, came into force.

By reason of the amendment made in 1945, it is now the law that a grant constitutes an estate if it is expressed to be of a named village, irrespective of whether some of the lands in the village are already held under inam or service grants or whether there has been a reservation of part of the village for communal purposes. The test is whether the grant purports to be of a particular village.

We will now proceed to state the nature of the five appeals before us. They arise out of suits filed by the appellant in the Court of the District Munsiff of Bhimavaram for the ejectment of the respondents from lands which they had occupied as his tenants. The respondents pleaded that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction because the lands formed part of an estate within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act. The suits were instituted before the amendment of the Act in 1945 and the plaintiff averred that the grant under which he held the lands was not a grant of a whole village. The District Munsiff found for the plaintiff on the ground that parts of the village were held under earlier grants and that the poramboke was reserved to the grantor. He relied on the decision in Ademma v. Satyadhyana Thirtha Su-amivaru1. The decrees for ejectment passed by the District Munsiff were confirmed by the Subordinate Judge of Narsapur on appeal. The defendants then appealed to this Court. Their appeals were heard by Somayya, J., after the passing of the Madras Estates Land (Amendment) Act, 1945. The learned Judge carefully considered all the relevant documents and found that the grant was of a named village and therefore the defendants were entitled to rights of permanent occupancy. The learned Judge also held that the grant covered the poramboke. The landholders have now appealed under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, leave having been granted.

The finding of the Subordinate Judge that the grant was not a grant of a whole village is not binding on this Court, because it is not a finding of fact. It is a finding based on the Subordinate Judge’s interpretation of certain documents. In Sherfuddin v. Kairoon Bi1this Court held that an inference to be drawn from entries in registers was a question of law. Somayya, J., had the right to form his own opinion as to the effect of the entries in the inam registers and to construe the grant.

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