The Chief Justice.-

The respondents and their brother, Pedda Gangappa, were members of a joint Hindu family. The family became divided in 1913 and, according to the respondents, the lands forming the joint estate were divided between the brothers. Pedda Gangappa died in 1933. These petitions arise out of suits filed by the respondents in the Court of the District Munsif of Bellary to recover the. properties which had been allotted to them at the partition. Each alleged that he had been given possession of his share but had been dispossessed by the petitioner, an alienee from the widow of Pedda Gangappa. The reliefs sought were valued at ten times the land revenue which was payable. The petitioner contended that the respondents were bound in law to value the reliefs asked for in accordance with the market values of the properties claimed by them and consequently he asked the District Munsif to appoint a Commissioner to ascertain the market values. The respondents objected. They said that by reason of the decision of this Court in Subramania Aiyar v. Rama Aiyar1, they could only be compelled to pay court-fees on the basis of the land revenue paid by them. The District Munsif accepted this contention notwithstanding that there were several decisions of this Court to the contrary. The petitioner now asks this Court to revise the District Munsif’s orders. The petitions have been placed before a Full Bench because of the conflict of authority.

Section 7(v) (d) of the Court-Fees Act says that in suits for the possession of land, houses and gardens the court-fee shall be according to the value of the subject-matter and where the land forms part of an estate paying revenue to Government, but is not a definite share of the estate and is not separately assessed, the value shall be deemed to be the market value of the land. By a notification issued by the Governor-General in Council on the 10th September, 1889, it was provided that, when a part of an estate paying annual revenue to the Government under a settlement which is not permanent is recorded in the Collector’s register as separately assessed with such revenue, the value of the subject-matter of a suit for the possession of a fractional share of that part shall, for the purposes of the computation of the court-fee chargeable in the-suit, be deemed not to exceed five times such portion of the revenue separately assessed on that part as may be rateably payable in respect of the share. On the 10th September, 1921, the Provincial Government issued a notification embodying a similar provision, but in 1932 it directed that the court-fee should he assessed at ten times the revenue instead of five times.

Until the decision in Subramania Ayyar v. Rama Aiyar1, this Court had consistently held that, when a person is suing, for a decree for possession of specific immoveable property, the court-fee must be paid on the market value of the land notwithstanding that it had formed part of an estate paying revenue to the Government. See Godavarty Sundaramma v. Godavarty Mang-amma1, Kandaswami Goundan v. Subbai Goundan2, Viswanatha Aiyar v. Ramaswami Naidu3 and Raghava Reddiar v: Krishna Reddiar4. The judgment in Subramania Aiyar v. Rama Aiyar5 was delivered by Ramesam, J., sitting with Cornish, J. It was there held that the notification of the 10th September, 1921, covered a case where the plaintiff was suing for the recovery of possession of a specified immoveable property which had formed part of an estate. The Court was of the opinion that the words “fractional share” in the notification covered both a definite fraction and also an indefinite fraction. In other words the learned Judges considered that the deciding factor was whether the land had formed part of an estate paying revenue to the Government. This decision not only conflicts with the previous decisions of this Court but also is in conflict with three decisions of the Allahabad High Court, Reference under the Court-Fees Act, 1870, section

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