The property which is the subject-matter of the suit out of which this appeal arises belonged to one Chinnayya. The plaintiff claims to be a son of Chinnayya by a permanently kept concubine. The first defendant is the legitimate son of Chinnayya, a man of feeble intellect. The second defendant is his wife. The third defendant, who is the husband of Gangamma, a daughter of Chinnayya, claims to have been taken into the family of Chinnayya as his illatom son-in-law. This suit was tried in part with another suit filed by the third defendant, claiming an equal share in the property of Chinnayya with the legitimate son, the first defendant, on the basis of his adoption as an illatom son-in-law and a common judgment was delivered.

The principal questions tried in the suit were whether the plaintiff was a dasi putra, entitled to a half of the share of a legitimate son, and (2) whether the will Ex. D-1, was true and valid. The learned Judge upheld the contention of the plaintiff that he was a dasi putra: but held that the will of Chinnayya was binding on the plaintiff and that he could be given nothing more than had been bequeathed to him under the will. In this Court, it is not denied that the plaintiff is the son by the permanently kept concubine; and so the only question remaining is whether the will, under which he was left a sum of Rs. 100 only, is binding on him.

As originally framed, there was no issue in this suit, as there was in the connected suit, whether the will was binding on the plaintiff; and it is argued that since the judge allowed such an issue to be framed at a very late stage, when the evidence was alomost concluded, the plaintiff was not given a fair opportunity of combating the will. The two suits were however tried together; and even at an earlier stage in the suit, when the learned Judge refused to add an additional issue relating to the will, because it was not then quite clear to him that the issue would be relevant, he stated that he might allow the issue to be raised at a later stage. Although the plaintiff objected to the examination of D.W. 4 to speak to the will; yet he at no time asked the Court for an adjourment in order to enable him to adduce the evidence to repel the evidence let in on the defendants’ side. Even in this Court, the learned Advocate for the plaintiff is unable to say that there are any witnesses whom he would have examined in the trial Court, had he been given a further opportunity. We are therefore of opinion that the appellant has not been prejudiced in any way by the procedure adopted by the learned District Judge.

The appellant’s learned advocate argues that the lower Court did not give sufficient attention to the question whether the land which was the subject of the suit was the self-acquired property of Chinnayya or was ancestral property, although that question was raised in the pleadings in the other suit. We have examined the grounds of appeal to this Court and find no allegation that the property was ancestral property that could not be disposed of by will.

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[After examining the evidence His Lordship continued]

Since there is no evidence of any value in rebuttal, we accept the evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 4 and hold that their evidence proves that the testator was in a sound disposing state of mind when he gave instructions for the drafting of the will and executed it.

The only other question is whether by clause 4 of the will the testator bequeathed the residue of his property to his legitimate son. If he did, then it is agreed that nothing more can be decreed to the plaintiff than was given to him by the learned District Judge. If, however, there was no bequest of the residue to the legitimate son, then there would be an intestacy with regard to the bulk of the property, and the plaintiff would not be deprived of a share of it. Clause 4 of the will does not specifically contain words of bequest. It seemed to assume that the property other than the property which was