This appeal arises out of a decision given by the District Judge of West Godavari in O.S. No. 8 of 1944. That suit purported to be filed under section 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act and related to the property of the Malleswaraswami temple at Relangi. This temple was notified by Government under Chapter VI-A of the Act and the first plaintiff was duly appointed the executive officer. Later, after the suit was filed, he was replaced by the second plaintiff. The defendants are said to be in possession of the temple lands and to have been at one time prior to the appointment of the plaintiffs de facto if not de jure trustees of the temple.

The plaint asks that the entire interest in the suit land-the properties of the temple-should be declared to be the endowment of the temple and be vested in the plaintiffs. Next the plaintiffs ask for an account of the income of the property and of the expenses incurred by the defendants for the yearly kalyanam and that the defendants be ordered to pay over the moneys remaining in their hands with interest. Thirdly, the plaintiffs ask for possession of the suit property.

The first issue framed in the suit related to jurisdiction. The learned District Judge nevertheless decided to consider fully all the other issues and only at the end of his judgment to deal with the first issue. He went into this issue with great care and came to the conclusion that the suit was not a suitable one to be filed under section 73 of the Act and therefore that the proper Court should have been the Sub-Court at Narasapur, following the principle of section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, viz., that every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. It is a pity we think that he did not go on and decide the whole case himself because then the matter would have been ended once for all and it would not have been possible for the defendants to have canvassed the matter on appeal at any rate on the ground that there was want of jurisdiction. However, as the learned Judge felt bound to decide the question of jurisdiction and to decide it against the plaintiffs it is not for us or any one to criticise his scrupulousness in this regard.

The point that we have to determine is whether, in fact, this is the type of suit contemplated by section 73 of the Act. That part of the section which may be applicable is as follows:

"(1) The Board or any person having interest and having obtained the consent of the Board may institute a suit in the Court to obtain a decree for any of the following reliefs:................(d) directing accounts and inquiries in respect of the administration or management of a math, temple or specific endowment attached to a math or temple."

Having regard to the plaint in this case sub-section (d) is the only one material. It has been said many times that section 73 of the Act is to the same effect as section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its implications. Is this the type of suit contemplated by the section? In our opinion it is not. Here the plaintiffs are the duly appointed trustees of this temple. They are endeavouring to exert their right to possession; possession of the trust property-and to oust the defendants who by reason of the plaintiffs’ appointment have become no more and no less than trespassers. It may be that the defendants are still endeavouring to carry out the functions as though they were still trustees and of course in so doing they will be answerable for their acts. But when the plaint uses the word "accounts" it is not that they are being asked to account since the appointment of the plaintiffs as trustees although of course they may be compelled to give an account of their trusteeship upto the moment when it legally expired. The plaintiffs here are not persons "having an interest" in the sense that they are members of the public who wish to see that the temple and the trust property are properly administered but they a