This revision petition is filed by the defendant against the order of the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin upholding the decision of the District Munsiff of Srivaikuntam passed under Order 22, rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code.

One Bathummal Beevi executed a power of attorney in favour of the defendant authorising him to manage her properties and to make collections of the rents and profits of the shops and buildings. The defendant who was thus constituted the plaintiff’s agent continued to manage until the power of attorney was revoked. As the defendant did not render an account of his management to Bathummal Beevi, the principal, she instituted a suit for an account and for recovery of the amount found due after taking acccounts. She assigned her rights in the money due from the defendant to the present respondent on the 3rd July, 1943, whereby the assignee was clothed with rights to recover from the defendant all the amounts belonging to the assignor and remaining in the hands of the defendant; and, if necessary by joining himself as a plaintiff in the suit already instituted. There was a preliminary decree in the suit on the 23rd September, 1943, and the original plaintiff died on the 13th November, 1945. On the 27th December, 1945, the assignee applied under Order 22, rule 10 of the Code to implead him as a party to the suit on the strength of the assignment. The District Munsiff recognised the assignment and impleaded him as plaintiff. This order was confirmed on appeal by the Subordinate Judge.

In this revision petition against the order of the Subordinate Judge the only point urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the order of the learned Judge recognising the assignment as valid, is erroneous as what was assigned under the document was a mere right to sue and not the property. The question is whether this contention is well founded.

Under section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act property of any kind may be transferred and one of the exceptions is that a mere right to sue cannot be transferred. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that the right claimed by the principal against the agent in this suit is merely a right to damages and not property. It must be noted here that the basis of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is not that the agent was guilty of any act of negligence and that therefore she is entitled to recover money from the defendant as damages. Her case is that certain property was entrusted to the defendant as agent for management and that during the course of such management he failed to pay to her the balance due after rendering proper accounts. In essence, therefore, the claim is that her property remained in the hands of the defendant and that she is entitled to recover it back. It is difficult to see how a claim of this kind can be said to be a mere right to sue. No doubt in order to recover the property of the plaintiff in the hands of the defendant a suit may be necessary if an account is not rendered by the defendant, the agent, and the balance in his hands is not made over to the plaintiff, the principal. But that does not mean that what is assigned is merely a right to institute the suit. In my opinion the transfer is of the property in the hands of the defendant. It may be that the assignee may have to institute a suit or as in the present case may have to continue the suit already instituted. But that would not make the assignment any the less an assignment of the property. In, cases where a person sues merely for damages there is no property in the hands of the defendant in the action; the assignment of that right could clothe the assignee merely with a right to institute an action and recover whatever is possible to recover in such a suit. The object of the assignment is not to transfer any property but merely a right of action.

Bearing these facts in mind the decisions cited by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the petitioner may now be considered. The case on