The Chief Justice.-

The three plaintiffs and the first defendant are first cousins, being grandsons of one Sankarapandiam Pillai; the plaintiffs are the sons of Subbasamia Pillai and the first defendant is the son of Narayanasamia Pillai, who were sons of the parties’ grandfather. Sankarapandiam Pillai married a second time in 1915. Previously, there was an arrangement in the family regarding the division of the property belonging to it and Sankarapandiam Pillai took a one-third share. He died in 1923. A son by the second wife, Subbiah Pillai, died in 1925. The widow’s death took place in 1943. The three plaintiffs claimed three shares, each one-fourth, in Sankarapandiam Pillai’s property, agreeing that the first defendant was entitled to the remaining one-fourth share. The plaintiffs’ claims were the subject-matter of the suit. It is unnecessary to refer to the second and third defendants.

After the pleadings were closed, issues were framed, the first issue being as follows:

“Whether the suit is not maintainable for the reason that all the plaintiffs have not signed the plaint but the third plaintiff has signed under a power?”

The third plaintiff held a power of attorney from his two brothers, the other two plaintiffs, and he alone signed the plaint. The defendant’s contention, arising out of that circumstance, is the following: the power of attorney does not authorise the third plaintiff to institute suits on behalf of the other two plaintiffs; consequently the suit, instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin, can be treated only as a suit by the third plaintiff and the sole relief to which he is entitled is a one fourth share in his grandfather’s estate; the value of that share is such that the suit would fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of the District Munsiff of Tuticorin and not within the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge’s Court; consequently that Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

The above issue was tried as a preliminary issue on the 18th July, 1945, when it was held that the power of attorney, although not happily worded, did include authority for the third plaintiff to institute suits for and on behalf of the other two plaintiffs and, consequently, the objection raised by the first defendant fell to the ground.

It is convenient to go back in the order of date and to refer to an application, I.A. No. 367 of 1944, filed by the plaintiffs at the same time as the presentation of the plaint in the suit on the 22nd November, 1944. In that application, it was alleged that the third plaintiff held a power of attorney from the first and second plaintiffs authorising him to conduct all proceedings on their behalf in the capacity of their agent. That application was granted. Later, on the 28th March, 1945, the plaintiffs instituted a further application praying that permission may be given to enable the first and second plaintiffs to ratify the proceedings taken by the third plaintiff on their behalf. In the affidavit supporting that application it is stated that the suit, in which the plaint is signed by the third plaintiff, is one instituted on behalf of all the plaintiffs and, in paragraph 8, an offer was made by the first and second plaintiffs to sign the plaint. That application came for disposal on the same day as the trial of the preliminary issue on 18th July, 1945, and, in the light of the finding on the issue, the application was dismissed as being unnecessary. The first defendant presented a civil revision petition against the order recording the finding upon the effect of the power of attorney and the correctness of the third plaintiff instituting the suit on behalf of himself and the other plaintiffs. That was presented on the 31st July, 1945, and subsequently it has been withdrawn and dismissed; but no point arises out of the dismissal.

The suit was posted for trial before the learned Additional Subordinate Judge on the 2nd August, 1945; it was known sometime previous to t

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