The main legal point established in the judgment is the eligibility of newly appointed trustees to execute a decree and the limitations on the executing Court's jurisdiction to question the validity of a decree.

Beasley, C.J.

1. The facts out of which this appeal arises have already been set out in the judgment in Adinarayana Chetty v. Narasimha Chetty A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 471. On 19th July 1925, the newly appointed trustees, as petitioners sought to execute the decree of the Subordinate Judge referred to in C.B.P. No. 1399 of 1925 and they filed E.P. No. 51 of 1925. The respondents opposed that petition and raised a number of objections before the then Subordinate Judge of Vellore who dismissed the petition on the grounds that the newly appointed trustees, the petitioners, were not parties to the decree and had not been added as parties Under Order 1, Rule 10, Civil P.C.; that the right to execute the decree was not given to them; that they had not come Under Order 22, Rule 10, Civil P.C., and were not transferees of the decree, and further that the order that the Court was to approve of the appointment of the newly elected trustees was ultra vires and also that the decree is a variation of the provisions of the consent decree. The learned Subordinate Judge further said that the trustees must come by a separate suit and have their claims as trustees recognized by the Court--this notwithstanding the fact that an application was made to the Court for the approval of the appointment of the newly elected trustees, and the Courts approval was given. On behalf of the respondents it is pointed out that the plaintiffs in the suit first sought to execute the decree by an execution petition but that owing to the right of the plaintiffs to execute the decree being questioned in the office, the petition was withdrawn and the present petitioners, the appellants here, substituted for the plaintiffs in the suit.

2. This, it is argued on behalf of the respondents is contrary to all practice and that the petitioners should have applied to have themselves brought on the record as parties to the suit and that not having done so they cannot execute the decree nor can they be treated as assignees of the decree and continue the proceedings because the procedure provided for by Order 22, Rule 10, has not been followed: Ratnam. Pillai v. Annamalai Desikar A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 615. Much reliance was placed upon the Full Bench decision in Veeraraghavachariar v. Advocate-General of Madras A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 1073 because it was argued that the provision in the scheme, that after the new trustees had been elected their appointment was subject to the confirmation of the Court was ultra vires. The Full Bench, of which I was a member, held that if in a decree for a scheme framed Under Section 92, Civil P.C., liberty is given to persons to apply to the Court for directions merely to carry out the scheme already settled such reservation of liberty in the decree will be intra vires if the assistance of the Court can be given without offending against Section 92, Civil P.C.; but where liberty is given to apply to the Court for alteration or modification of the scheme such reservation is ultra vires as offending against that section. It is very strange to find that the respondents who were parties to the suit and the compromise decree and agreed to the scheme now were here contending that the provision is ultra vires and, in my opinion, they have not only shown themselves obstructive but have misapplied the Full Bench decision. Dealing with this question Phillips, J., on p. 44 says:

This principle therefore of reserving liberty to apply in temple suits appears to me to be based on wrong premises. It should only be done when the Court is unable, or for good reasons thinks it advisable not to finally determine any question arising for its decision but to leave such decisions for a future date. Unless there is some ground of this sort, the decision must necessarily be final and therefore that such final decision can be altered by a mere application would seem to be ultra vires. I may observe here that the question put to us is a double question and the answer to the two parts o