Reilly, J.

1. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment which my learned brother is about to deliver and with which I entirely agree.

2. Section 109(a), Civil P.C., gives a right of appeal to His Majesty in Council from any decree made on appeal by a. High Court. Section 110, Civil P.C., qualifies that right of appeal by making two exceptions to it. First there is no appeal Under Section 109(a) if the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first instance or in dispute in the proposed appeal is less than Rs. 10,000 and the decree does not involve directly or indirectly some claim or question to or respecting property of that amount or value. Secondly there is no appeal Under Section 109(a) if the decree of the High Court affirms the decision of the Court immediately below the High Court and the proposed appeal does not involve any substantial question of law. These two exceptions, as they partially take away the right of appeal given by Section 109(a), must; be strictly construed. In the present case prima facie there is no difficulty in respect of the first exception, as admittedly the amount of the subject matter of the suit in the Court of first instance and in the proposed appeal is over Rs. 10,000.

3. It is not suggested that the proposed appeal involves any substantial question of law; but the petitioner will be entitled to appeal if the decree of the High Court did not affirm the decision of the Subordinate Judge. At one time it was held by the Calcutta High Court that, even when a decree of that Court had modified a decree of the lower Court on appeal it was an affirming decree for the purpose of Section 110, Civil P.C., so far as it agreed with the decision of the lower Court, and that, if the proposed appeal to His Majesty in Council referred only to that part of the decree, some substantial question of law was necessary to give a right of appeal. That view, which it may be pointed out involved the implication of words not found in Section 110, was taken in Rajah Sree Nath Roy Bahadur v. Secy. of State, [1904] 8 C.W.N. 294 and Annapurna Rai v. Ruprao A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 60, but has been shown to be incorrect by the decision of the Judicial Committee in the latter case. Although that implied extension of the exceptions to Section 109(a) is no longer possible, it is urged for defendant 2 that we are still entitled to effect a different extension of the exceptions by reading the last clause of Section 110 as if it ran:

provided that, so far as the decree or final order appealed from in respect of any separable part of the case affirms, etc.

and that, if that part involves no substantial question of law, it should be excluded in calculating the necessary Rs. 10,000. That view appears to have been taken in Narendra Lal Das v. Gopendra Lal Das A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 543 and Kapurji Magniram v. Pannaji Debichand A.I.R. 1929 Bom. 359. But with great respect I am not prepared to follow these decisions. If a decree is really a composite decree or a series of decrees dealing with what should strictly be the subject of separate suits, e.g., a decree dealing with alienations in favour of different; defendants, which by long established practice we have allowed to be made the subject of one suit, then it may be proper to separate each decree of the series for the purpose of appeal to His Majesty in Council. But apart from that in my opinion we are bound by the plain language of Section 110, Civil P.C., and are not at liberty to read into it any words which are not to be found there actually or by necessary implication. A decree for the payment of a certain amount, which is the result of taking an account, is one decree, and not a series of decrees merely because it is the result of decisions in respect of a number of items. If the High Courts decree in such a case does not entirely affirm the decision of the Court immediately below it, then it is not an affirming decree within the meaning of Section 110,