The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the jurisdiction of the civil court, the rules for appointment and succession, and the powers of the Revenue Divisional Officer in making appointments and disallowing them.

Madhavan Nair, J.

1. The defendant is the appellant. This second appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff for a declaration that the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer of Kavali dated 18th May 1925, appointing the defendant as karnam of Somavarappadu, is ultra vires and does not bind him.

2. On a vacancy arising in the office of karnam in the proprietary village of Somavarappadu, the proprietor appointed the plaintiff to the office by his order dated 9th December 1924 and sent notice of the appointment as required by the Act (Act 2 of 1894) to the revenue divisional officer, Kavali. On the ground that he is a nearer heir the defendant, a minor by his guardian, applied to the revenue "divisional officer praying that he should be appointed as the karnam. On 18th May 1925 the revenue divisional officer disallowed the appointment of the plaintiff as karnam holding that the defendant was the next heir to the office and directed the registration of his name as heir to the last holder of the office.

3. The plaintiffs case is that the order of the revenue divisional officer is illegal and ultra vires, and he prays for its cancellation.

4. The defendants case is : (1) that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit by reason of the provisions of Section 21, Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, Act 3 of 1895, and the Madras Proprietary Village Service Act, Act 2 of 1894; (2) that a suit of this nature is barred by Section 42, Specific Relief Act; (3) that even according to the pedigree sent by the proprietor to the revenue divisional officer he, the defendant, is the next heir to the office in question and not the plaintiff; and that the revenue divisional officer has on this ground jurisdiction to set aside the proprietors order appointing the plaintiff who is not the next heir to the office; and (4) that the plaintiffs only right is to prefer an appeal under Section 11 (3), Act 2 of 1894 against the order of the revenue divisional officer.

5. The Madras Act of 1894 admittedly applies to the office of the karnam in question and the provisions of the Madras Act 3 of 1895 also apply to it by reason of Section 3 (1) of that Act. Section 21, Act 3 of 1895 provides that no civil Court shall have authority to take into consideration or decide any claim to succeed to any of the offices specified in section...

6. The office in question being an office specified in Section 3, the question is whether the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Section 13 (1) of the same Act provides that any person may sue before the Collector for any of the village offices specified in Section 3...

on the ground that he is entitled under Sub-section 2 or Sub-section 3, Section 10, Madras Proprietary Estates Village Service Act, Act 2 of 1894, to hold such office subject to certain provisions. Section 10, Madras Proprietary Estates Village Service Act, Act 2 of 1894, lays down certain rules to be observed by the proprietor in making the appointment. It contains three subsections; Sub-section 1 sets out the qualifications to be possessed by the person to be appointed; Sub-section 2, the rule of succession to be followed; and Sub-section 3, the rule to be followed in case the next heir is sot qualified, or in case there is no heir at all. It has been held in a series of decisions in this Court: Krishnaswami Naidu v. Akkulammal [1919] 50 I.C. 185, Muvvula Seetharam Naidu v. Doddi Rami Naidu [1910] 33 Mad. 208 and Kodandaramayya v. Ramalingayya [1920] 60 I.C. 650, that Section 21, Act 3 of 1895, takes away the jurisdiction of the civil Court only in cases in which the jurisdiction is conferred on the revenue Courts by Section 13 of the Act. The correctness of this proposition of law is not challenged by the learned advocate for the appellant. What he argues is that the plaintiffs present suit, though the plaint is cleverly worded to take it out of the scope of Section 13, is substantially a suit for the village office