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2012 Supreme(Mad) 287
High Court of Judicature at Madras
M. VENUGOPAL
Narayanasami Padayachi (Died)
Versus
Anbazhagan & Others
Second Appeal No.950 of 1999
Decided On :Decided On : 19-01-2012
For the Appellant:Ms. A. Nilaphar for R. Subramanian, R. Meenal, Advocates.
For the Respondents - R. Muralidharan, Advocate.
The main legal point established in the judgment is the importance of considering all evidence, including expert opinion, in determining material alteration in negotiable instruments.
Headnote:
Material Alteration - Negotiable Instruments Act - Section 118, Section 114, Section 87 - The court discussed the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the concept of material alteration under Section 87, and the role of evidence in rebutting presumptions. The court emphasized the importance of considering all evidence and not solely relying on visual inspection to determine material alteration. The judgment was based on the finding that the promissory note did not suffer from material alteration and was validly executed by the defendant.
Fact of the Case:
The case involved a dispute over a promissory note dated 28.12.1989, with the defendant claiming that the year was altered from 1987 to 1989. The plaintiff sought recovery of the amount mentioned in the promissory note.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the promissory note did not suffer from material alteration and was validly executed by the defendant. The court also rejected the defendant's plea of discharge and the claim of limitation, ultimately allowing the second appeal filed by the plaintiff.
Issues: The issues revolved around the validity of the promissory note, the alleged material alteration, the discharge of the promissory note, and the plea of limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the finding that the promissory note did not suffer from material alteration, the defendant failed to discharge the promissory note, and the claim of limitation was rejected.
Final Decision: The second appeal filed by the plaintiff was allowed, setting aside the judgments of the lower courts. The respondents were directed to pay the promissory note amount with interest and costs.
1. The Appellant (Legal Representative of the Plaintiff) has preferred the present Second Appeal as against the Judgment and Decree dated 20.01.1998 in A.S.No.218 of 1994 passed by the Learned District Judge, Cuddalore in affirming the Judgment and Decree dated 29.04.1994 made in O.S.No.95 of 1993 passed by the Learned Principal Sub Judge (I/c), Cuddalore.
2. The First Appellate Court viz., the Learned District Judge, Cuddalore in A.S.No.218 of 1994 (filed by the father of the Appellant/Plaintiff) while passing the Judgment on 20.01.1998 has observed that "in this case the year was found to have been altered from 1987 to 1989, to suit the convenience of the plaintiff. A loop was subsequently found connected to the top of the letter "7" so as to make it appear as "9". Thus, the year 1987 was altered as 1989 etc., and opined that the trial Court rightly dismissed the suit and resultantly dismissed the Appeal with costs.
3. Earlier, before the trial Court, in the main suit on behalf of the Plaintiff, witnesses P.Ws.1 and 2 have been examined and Exs.A1 to A4 have been marked. On the side of the Defendant, witness D.W.1 has been examined and no documents have been marked.
4. The trial Court, on an appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, has come to a categorical conclusion that the date of promissory note is a material portion of it and any alteration of such date will normally avoid the pronote and has come to the consequent conclusion that the suit pronote has been materially altered viz., the year 1987 has been altered into 1989 and further held that the suit is clearly barred by time and dismissed the suit with costs.
5. At the time of admission of the Second Appeal, this Court has formulated the following Substantial Questions of Law 1 to 3:-
1) Whether in Law the Courts below did not err in ignoring the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act that Ex.A1 is true, since the Defendant had admitted to executing it?
2) Whether in Law the Courts below are right in overlooking that the onus is on the Defendant to prove discharge and that he had not at all proved it by any evidence?
3)Whether in Law, the Lower Appellate Court is right in failing in its duty as the final Court of facts and evidence to give an independent finding as to whether there is material alteration in Ex.A.1?
6. The Contentions, Discussions and Findings on Substantial Questions of Law 1 to 3:-
According to the Learned counsel for the Appellant (Legal representative of the Deceased Plaintiff), the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court should have seen that when execution of the pronote is admitted by the Defendant (since deceased), it is for him to prove the discharge and also that the suit pronote, Ex.A1 dated 28.10.1989, as seen through naked eye is not an altered one.
7. The Learned counsel for the Appellant urges before this Court that the Defendants (since deceased) plea of discharge of the purported pronote of the year 1987 is not barred by any evidence on record.
8. Lastly, it is the submission of the Learned counsel for the Appellant that the First Appellate Court has merely proceeded on presumption and assumptions and as such, the Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.218 of 1994, dated 20.01.1998 are vitiated in law.
9. Per contra, it is the contention of the Learned counsel for the Respondents (Legal Representatives of the Deceased Defendant) that both the Courts below have rightly come to the correct conclusion that Ex.A1, suit pronote dated 28.10.1989, suffers from material alteration and in fact, both the Courts have categorically held that the year 1987 in Ex.A1, Pronote dated 28.10.1989, has been altered namely, the year 1987 has been altered into 1989 and filed the suit. Therefore, the concurrent findings need not be interfered with by this Court.
10. A perusal of the Plaint averments in the main suit (filed by the Appellant/plaintiff deceased) rea
