The central legal point established in the judgment is that matters related to recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service fall under the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal, except in extraordinary circumstances.

1. In this Writ Petition, the petitioner seeks for a direction to consider his representation and include his name in the panel for promotion and Conferment of Indian Administrative Service yearwise for the year 2011 under Non-State Civil Service Category of Tamil Nadu Government. He also claimed that the 4th and 5th respondents only recommended his case.

2. Though the Writ Petition is for a direction to consider the representation by the 1st respondent, Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu, yet the subject matter of the Writ Petition relates to recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service and under Sections 14(1)(a) and 14(1)(b) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, the jurisdiction to entertain such matters vests solely with the Central Administrative Tribunal.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner though contended that he is only seeking for a direction to the Chief Secretary to the State Government, such a contention cannot be permitted. If the matter relates to recruitment to Indian Administrative Service and the issue arises therefrom, the jurisdiction only vests with the Central Administrative Tribunal and not this Court.

4. Though in L.Chandrakumar Vs. Union of India reported in 1997 (3) SCC 261, the Supreme Court held that the power under Article 226 cannot be divested by any Act of Parliament, in the same judgment, the Supreme Court held that any aggrieved party must approach the Central Administrative Tribunal at the first instance and if he is further aggrieved, he can move the High Court by virtue of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even those matters will have to be heard only by a division bench.

5. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in T.K.Rangarajan Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and others reported in 2003 (6) SCC 581 has held that in an extraordinary circumstance, the Court can entertain a writ petition at the first instance. But that was given in a context that two lakhs Government employees have been dismissed by the Government without enquiry. Such exceptional circumstances do not arise in any of these matters.

6. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajeev Kumar Vs. Hemraj Singh Chauhan reported in (2010) 4 SCC 554. The relevant passages found in paragraphs 7 to 16 of the said judgment may be usefully extracted below:

7. However, while answering the objection on their locus standi, the appellants referred to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India1 and in particular to para 99, p. 311 at placita f and g of the Report and contended that in view of the law declared in L. Chandra Kumar1, they can come before the High Court and raise their grievances against the judgment of CAT as their interests have been affected by that judgment even though they were not parties to the proceedings in which the said judgment was rendered.

8. This Court is of the view that the understanding of the ratio in L. Chandra Kumar1 by the learned counsel for the appellants in this case is not correct and the ratio in L. Chandra Kumar1 is just to the contrary.

9. The Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar1 held that the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the basic structure of our Constitution (see paras 78 and 79, pp. 301 and 302 of the Report). The Constitution Bench also held that various tribunals created under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution, will function as court of first instance and are subject to the power of judicial review of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench also held that these tribunals are empowered even to deal with constitutional questions and can also examine the vires of statutory legislation, except the vires of the legislation which creates the particular tribunal.

10. In para 93, at p. 309 of the Report, the Cons