The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, specifically regarding the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award and the scope of remitting the matter back to the Arbitrator for fresh consideration.

The first respondent herein was appointed as Cargo Handling Agent by the petitioner viz., Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation Ltd., in the year 2000, for handling Wheat in the Port of Tuticorin. Disputes arose between the petitioner and the first respondent with regard to the payment of storage rent. Since the agreement between the petitioner and the first respondent contained an arbitration clause, the first respondent invoked the same and the second respondent herein was appointed as Arbitrator.

2. The Arbitrator conducted an enquiry and passed an award on 16.3.2006, dismissing the claim made by the first respondent. Aggrieved by the said award, the first respondent filed a petition in O.P.No.127 of 2006 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, on the file of the District Court, Tuticorin. When the same was pending, the first respondent filed an Interlocutory Application in I.A.No.206 of 2007 under Section 34 (4) of the Act, seeking to remit the award back to the Arbitrator so as to eliminate the grounds for setting aside the award.

3. By an order dated 3.2.2008, the District Court, Tuticorin, allowed the application I.A.No.206 of 2007 and remitted the matter back to the Arbitrator for fresh consideration after sufficient opportunities to both sides and further directed the award already passed to be kept in abeyance for a period of six months in terms of Section 34 (4) of the Act. Aggrieved by the said order passed by the District Court, Tuticorin in I.A.No.206 of 2007, the petitioner has come up with the present Civil Revision Petition.

4. Heard Mr. M. Vallinayagam, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. N. Dilipkumar, learned counsel for the first respondent. The second respondent is the Arbitrator and hence is only a formal party.

5. Mr. M. Vallinayagam, learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the order of the Court below on the following grounds viz.:-

(a) that the affidavit in support of I.A.No.206 of 2007 does not contain any averment that necessitates an order of remand by the Court below under Section 34 (4) of the Act;

(b) that the first respondent already made an attempt to canvas the same issues before the Arbitrator himself by filing an application under Section 33 of the Act, after the passing of the award, but the same was dismissed on 1.5.2006; and

(c) that in utter disregard to the scope of Section 34 (4) of the Act, the Court below remitted the matter back to the Arbitrator, throwing open for reconsideration, all the issues and thereby making it incumbent upon the Arbitrator to conduct proceedings afresh.

6. Mr. N. Dilipkumar, learned counsel for the first respondent contended that there were two issues, on which the Court below was convinced to remit the matter back to the Arbitrator. They are as follows:-

(i) In his claim petition, before the Arbitrator, the first respondent claimed that storage rent was paid to them by the very same petitioner under an identical contract entered into with the Bangalore Office of the petitioner and that therefore a departure made by the Chennai Office was unjustified. While dealing with the said issue, in paragraph-22 of the arbitration award, the Arbitrator recorded that after the conclusion of the proceedings before the Arbitrator, on 10.2.2006, a letter of clarification was obtained from the Bangalore Office to the effect that the payments made by the Bangalore Office of the petitioner were erroneously made. An affidavit to the same effect along with a document was filed before the Arbitrator, after the conclusion of the proceedings and the Arbitrator decided the issue on the basis of the affidavit and the document, without furnishing copies of the same and affording an opportunity to the first respondent. Therefore the remand of the matter became inevitable, so as to give an opportunity to challenge the affidavit and the document produced after the conclusion of the proceedings.

(ii) Before the Arbitrator, the first responde