The legal point established is that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act can be entitled to exemption under G.O.Ms.2000 based on its charitable objectives.

1. The question of law that has been framed for consideration in this Second Appeal is as follows:

“Whether the Respondent Society is a Trust as defined under the Trust Act to fall under the purview of G.O.Ms.2000 Home Department dated 16th August 1976, to be exempted from the provision of Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, more particularly when it is registered as a society on 5.7.1922 under Societies Registration Act?

2. The brief facts are that the respondent herein filed O.S. No. 200 of 1995 to direct the appellant to vacate and hand over the possession of the suit scheduled property which is a shop in which the appellant was inducted as a tenant to run a cycle shop. The appellant was running a cycle shop under the name and style of “Maruthy Cycle Mart”. According to the respondent a notice to quit was given to the appellant on 27.4.1995 and inspite of the notice since the appellant failed to vacate and hand over the possession of the suit scheduled property the respondent was obliged to file the suit.

3. The said suit was resisted by the appellant contending that the suit was not maintainable, that though the suit scheduled property belonged to the respondent, it is not correct to say that the respondent was in need of the suit scheduled property for its personal purposes.

4. According to the appellant, he himself filed the suit against the respondent for injunction in O.S. No. 339 of 1994. Both the suits, the one filed by the appellant as well as the present suit in O.S. No.

200 of 1995 were tried together and by a common judgment dated 27.3.1997, the trial Court decreed the suit in O.S. No. 200 of 1995 and O.S. No. 339 of 1994 confirming that the appellant could be evicted only under due process of law. As against the judgment and decree dated 27.3.1997 in O.S. No. 200 of 1995, the appellant preferred A.S. No. 432 of 1999.

5. It is relevant to note that in the decree granted in O.S. No. 200 of 1995, the appellant was directed to hand over the possession of the suit scheduled property on or before 27.06.1977. Against the dismissal of A.S. No. 432 of 1999 dated 18.07.2000 the petitioner has come forward with this Second Appeal.

6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant raised two contentions, namely that the suit filed by the respondent itself was not maintainable, in as much as according to the learned counsel, the respondent is not a juristic person to maintain the suit. The learned counsel further contended that in the G.O.Ms.2000 dated 16.8.1976 exemption had been granted only to Religious Public Trust and Public Charitable Trust, the respondent being only a society registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1960 was not entitled to claim the benefit of the said G.O. and on this sole ground the suit by the respondent was not maintainable.

7. Mr. Parthasarathy, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent would otherwise contend that the appellant having accepted the status of the respondent as its landlord as disclosed in his written statement filed in the suit and in the absence of any specific contention having been raised in the suit about the status of the respondent or its competence to maintain the suit, the courts below were fully justified in holding that the respondent was entitled to seek for eviction in its capacity as the owner of the suit scheduled property. The learned counsel further contended that when the appellant himself filed the suit against the respondent and thereby recognising the status of the respondent as the owner of the suit scheduled property, it is not open to the appellant to take a different stand. As regards the other contentions the learned counsel by relying upon the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Mulla Gulam Ali and Safiabai D. Trust v. Deelip Kumar and. Co. (2001 1 L.W. 652 = 2001 (I) CTC 688) and judgment of Justice Abdul Hadi, J. reported in Ranjan Deva Shayam v. Hindustan Bible Institute of India (1996 1 L.W. 53