The provisions of the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963) do not extinguish the rights of a person who held a ryotwari patta in his favor or was otherwise entitled to a ryotwari patta.

Appeal against the Decree of the District Judge, Thanjayur, dated 9.11.1993 in Appeal Suit No. 168 of 1992 preferred against the decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Pattukkotai dated 9.3.92 in Original Suit No. 44 of 1983.

At the time of admission, the following two substantial questions of law were framed by this Court:—

(i) Whether the lower appellate court is right in holding that the appellant temple cannot maintain the above suit for recovery of rent arrears from the respondent on the basis of the decision reported in 84 L.W. applying the principles laid down in 92 L.W. 376 and 93 L.W. 707 when admittedly the respondent became the tenant under the Appellants tempte in the year 1974 having purchased the superstructure from the erstwhile tenant much after the notified date?

(ii) Whether Lower Appellate Court was right in holding that by virtue of the provisions of Act 26 of 1963, the Appellant Temple has lost right to recover the rent from the respondent when the respondent himself has admitted the joint patta and also the payment of rents from 1974 to 1979 to the Appellants temple?

2. Heard Mr. S. Thiruvangadasamy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. V.K. Vijayaraghavan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent in the Second Appeal.

3. For convenience, the parties to this appeal will be referred as arrayed before the trial court.

4. The plaintiff instituted the suit O.S. No. 44 of 1983 on the file of the Sub Court, Pattukkottai, against the defendant seeking for recovery of arrears of rent from the defendant due to the plaintiff temple. According to the plaintiff, the suit property belong to the plaintiff temple. It is the further case of the plaintiff that the defendant who had purchased the superstructure from one Babu Rawther had executed a lease deed with respect to the site which belonged to the plaintiff in terms of lease deed which had expired on 13.12.1979. The plaintiff issued a notice terminating the lease on 11.12.1979. By a reply letter dated 19.12.1979, the defendant requested the plaintiff to renew the lease. On 16.6.1980 the defendant agreed to pay a rent of Rs. 525/- per month for the land commencing from 14.12.1979. That apart the defendant also requested the plaintiff to convey the suit property to him at the rate of Rs. 1,500/- per cent. The plaintiff while stating that the defendant did not pay the rent and after 14.12.1979, had filed the suit for recovery of arrears of rent aggregating to Rs. 18,900/-with interest. The defendant had also failed to surrender possession. The plaintiff claimed exclusive right to collection of rent and the defendant is a tenant in respect of the land and therefore he is liable to pay the rent in terms of the lease agreement.

5. The defendant while admitting the lease deed pleaded that what was agreed to is a lease at the rate of Rs. 120/- while the defendant further pleaded that he had put up constructions at a cost of Rs. 3.5 lakhs and he has been in enjoyment of the suit property. The defendant on the request of the plaintiff had executed a letter as if he is a tenant of the latter and as if he has requested for renewal of the lease. The defendant admitted that he had requested the plaintiff to sell the suit property. The defendant is in possession of the suit property as lessee, that on and after 16.6.1980 the defendant is not a lessee as the defendant has been in enjoyment of the suit property as per the agreement to sell at the rate of Rs. 525/- per cent and that the defendant is not liable to pay rent. According to the defendant the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any rent and the plaintiff has no right. The defendant further pleaded that he is not liable to pay Rs. 120/- per cent as a tenant to the owner.

6. On the said pleadings the trial court framed seven issues. The trial court at the first instance decreed the suit. As against the same an appeal was preferred by the defendant in A.S. No. 143 of 1986. Pending the first a