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1997 Supreme(Mad) 914

High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.S. SUBRAMANI
Veeramalai & Others
Versus
Murugesan & Others
S.A. No. 886 of 1993
Decided On :Decided on : 27-08-1997

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant:S. Parthasarathy, Advocate.
For the Respondents:R1 to R3 & R5 - R. Narayanan for T.M. Hariharan, Advocate.

The denial of title by the tenant in the written statement to a suit for ejectment determines the tenancy forthwith, thus giving the right to the landlord to the possession of the leased property, when the lease is not for a fixed period but from year to year or at will. The principle of justice, equity and good conscience requires that the landlord's termination of the tenancy in such a case is good even without a written notice.

Headnote:

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT - SECTION 111(G) - LEASE - FORFEITURE - NOTICE - AGRICULTURAL LEASE - EXEMPTION - PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE - DENIAL OF TITLE IN WRITTEN STATEMENT - EFFECT - CULTIVATING TENANTS PROTECTION ACT - SECTION 6-A - APPLICABILITY - CONDITIONS.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration that plaint A and B Schedule properties are family trust properties, and for recovery of B Schedule Items from defendants 3 to 5. The trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for. The lower Appellate Court confirmed the findings of the trial Court regarding the status of the plaintiffs as widow and children of Sellaperumal, but dismissed the suit so far as the plaint ‘B’ Schedule property was concerned on the ground that the plaintiffs have not issued notice of forfeiture as contemplated under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the denial of title by the tenant in the written statement to a suit for ejectment determines a tenancy forthwith, thus giving the right to the landlord to the possession of the leased property, when the lease is not for a fixed period but from year to year or at will. The Court further held that the principle of justice, equity and good conscience requires that the landlord's termination of the tenancy in such a case is good even without a written notice. The Court also held that the provisions of Section 6-A of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act will not be applicable in a case where the tenant has forfeited his right to be a tenant by denying the title of the landlord.

Issues: 1. Whether notice under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act is required for forfeiture of an agricultural lease? 2. Whether the denial of title by the tenant in the written statement to a suit for ejectment determines the tenancy forthwith? 3. Whether the principle of justice, equity and good conscience requires that the landlord's termination of the tenancy in such a case is good even without a written notice? 4. Whether the provisions of Section 6-A of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act will be applicable in a case where the tenant has forfeited his right to be a tenant by denying the title of the landlord?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The provisions of Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable to agricultural leases by virtue of Section 117 of the Act. 2. However, the principles embodied in Section 111 (g) are equally applicable to tenancies to which the Act does not apply on the ground of the same being in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience. 3. The denial of title by the tenant in the written statement to a suit for ejectment determines the tenancy forthwith, thus giving the right to the landlord to the possession of the leased property, when the lease is not for a fixed period but from year to year or at will. 4. The principle of justice, equity and good conscience requires that the landlord's termination of the tenancy in such a case is good even without a written notice. 5. The provisions of Section 6-A of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act will not be applicable in a case where the tenant has forfeited his right to be a tenant by denying the title of the landlord.

Final Decision: The Second Appeal was allowed and the appellants were given a decree to recover possession of ‘B’ Schedule properties from defendants.

Judgment :-

1. Plaintiffs in O.S. No. 317 of 1987, on the file of Principal District Munsifs Court, Kulithalai, are the appellants.

2. There are two items of properties A and B. In this Second Appeal, we are concerned only with the B Schedule Item.

3. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the ‘A’ Schedule property belonged to one Kothan Mulhiriar and he executed a Trust Deed by which his wife and two sons were directed to manage the Trust without alienating the same. Till his death, he was managing the Trust A Schedule properties, and on his death, his widow became the Trustee, and on the death of the widow, his two sons Karuppannan and Sellaperumal were jointly performing the charities. It is also alleged that out of the income of the ‘A’ Schedule properties, ‘B’ Schedule properties were purchased in the name of Karuppannan and the same also forms part of the Trust. The first defendant is the wife of Krishnan and second defendant is bis daughter. Since Krishnan was not on good terms with his wife and daughter, a suit for maintenance was filed against him as O.S. No. 572 of 1957 by which they were awarded separate maintenance. It is further averred that the father of third defendant Rajalingam was a co-worker with Karuppannan in Railways and he was residing adjacent to Karuppannan and Sellaperumal. He had an evil eye on the properties. Karuppannan died on 26.7.1978, and even thereafter, defendants 1 and 2 were living separately. It is said that after the death of Karuppannan, Sellaperumal, the other brother was doing the Charities. First plaintiff is the son of Sellaperumal, second plaintiff is the wife of Sellaperumal and plaintiffs 3 and 4 are the daughters of Sellaperumal.

4. It is said that due to evil influence of Rajalingam and his son, a lease has been created in respect of ‘B’ Schedule properties. The lease is invalid. Sellaperumal had no right on such lease deed, and the same also forms part of the trust property. Third defendant is not the lessee of the B Schedule property and, therefore, he cannot claim any benefit of the Tenancy Legislations. His possession is only that of a trespasser. Sellaperumal died on 3.9.198S, and thereafter, first plaintiff alone was enjoying the ‘A’ Schedule properties. It is said that defendants 1 and 2 were won over by third defendant, and, at the instance of third defendants brother, they attempted to interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the suit properties by first plaintiff. A suit for injunction was filed. In that suit, third defendant has filed a written statement questioning the status of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the suit was filed for declaration that plaint A and B Schedule properties are family trust properties, and for recovery of B Schedule Items from defendants 3 to S. In paragraph 15 of the plaint, it is further averred that the so called lease deed alleged to have been executed by Sellaperumal and also the Will alleged to have been executed in favour of defendants 3 to 5 are also invalid, and plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the plaint ‘B’ Schedule properties.

5. In the written statement filed by second defendant, i.e., daughter of Krishnan, she admitted the relationship of plaintiffs with Sellaperumal, and she also admitted that Sellaperumal was performing the charity after the death of his father. According to her, she has no objection for passing a decree since the third defendant has no right over the property and plaintiffs alone are entitled to the entire property without any encumbrance.

6. In the written statement filed by third defendant, it is said that the properties are self-acquired properties of Sellaperumal and they are not family properties. According to him, plaintiffs are not the children of Sellaperumal, and they have no right over plaint Schedule Items. Sellaperumal never married second plaintiff, and Sellaperumal died unmarried It is also his case that since the third defendant and his father were all residing close to Sellaper





































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