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1996 Supreme(Mad) 1273

High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.S. SUBRAMANI
Palaniswamy Konar
Versus
Gopala Konar & Others
S.A. No. 1495 of 1986
Decided On :Decided on : 27-12-1996

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant:S. Desikan for P. Gopalan, Advocates.
For the Respondents:S.V. Jayaraman for A. Amalraj, Advocates.

Admission alone will not confer title. Estoppel will not apply unless Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act applies.

Headnote:

ADMISSION - EVIDENCE ACT, SECTIONS 17 AND 31 - ESTOPPEL - EVIDENCE ACT, SECTIONS 17 AND 31 - SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - TITLE TO PROPERTY - TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, SECTION 43 - ADMISSION ALONE WILL NOT CONFER TITLE - ESTOPPEL WILL NOT APPLY UNLESS SECTION 43 OF THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT APPLIES - IN A SUIT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IS NOT A MATTER IN ISSUE - ADMISSION MADE IN EARLIER PROCEEDINGS WILL HAVE NO EVIDENTIARY VALUE IF THERE IS NO ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST THE ADMITTING PARTY - EXS. B-2 AND B-3 ARE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT THE SECOND DEFENDANT HAS NO TITLE.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiffs filed a suit claiming title to B and C Schedule properties and permitting them to recover the same from the first defendant, and in the alternative to partition the entire A Schedule property into two equal halves and one share to be allotted to plaintiffs, and in the event of such partition, as far as possible B and C Schedule properties may be allotted to their share in equity. Mesne profits was also claimed from first defendant.

Finding of the Court:

1. Admission alone will not confer title. 2. Estoppel will not apply unless Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act applies. 3. In a suit for specific performance, title to the property is not a matter in issue. 4. Admission made in earlier proceedings will have no evidentiary value if there is no estoppel as against the admitting party. 5. Exs. B-2 and B-3 are sufficient to prove that the second defendant has no title.

Issues: 1. Whether the judgments of the lower Courts are contrary to the decision of this Court in A.S. 330 of 1978? 2. Whether the suit without impleading the necessary parties is maintainable?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. Admission alone will not confer title. 2. Estoppel will not apply unless Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act applies. 3. In a suit for specific performance, title to the property is not a matter in issue. 4. Admission made in earlier proceedings will have no evidentiary value if there is no estoppel as against the admitting party. 5. Exs. B-2 and B-3 are sufficient to prove that the second defendant has no title.

Final Decision: The Second Appeal is allowed. Suit filed by the plaintiffs will stand dismissed. The appellant will be entitled to his costs in this Court.

Judgment :-

1. First defendant in O.S. No. 109 of 1983, on the file of Subordinate Judge, Pudukkottai, is the appellant herein.

2. Two plaintiffs filed the above suit claiming title to B and C Schedule properties respectively, and permitting them to recover the same from the first defendant, and in the alternative to partition the entire A Schedule property into two equal halves and one share to be allotted to plaintiffs, and in the event of such partition, as far as possible B and C Schedule properties may be allotted to their share in equity. Mesne profits was also claimed from first defendant.

3. Material averments in the plaint are as follows: B and C Schedule properties are portions of A Schedule. The entire A Schedule belonged to the family consisting of defendants 2 to 5. The second defendant is entitled to one half and defendants 3 to 5 are entitled to the other half. It is said that by a partition arrangement between them, second defendant was in enjoyment of B and C Schedule properties. As per Exx. A-1 and A-2 dated 21.6.1975, both the plaintiffs purchased the B and C Schedule items from the second defendant.

4. Third defendant, who is the father of second defendant, executed an agreement for sale in favour of first defendant. The agreement was to convey the entire A Schedule properties Second defendant was not a party. But the agreement stated that the third defendant is acting as agent of the second defendant. Since the sale deed was not executed in terms of the agreement, the first defendant herein filed O.S. No. 44 of 1975, on the file of District Judge Pudukkottai, for specific performance of the agreement for sale.

5. The trial Court decreed the suit in its entirety. But, as per Ex. A-3, this Court held that the third defendant is not entitled to enter into an agreement on behalf of the second defendant, and the decree was modified. First Defendant was given a decree for specific performance for one half share belonging to 3rd defendant on payment of the entire sale consideration stipulated in the deed. That decision ha become final. It is said that when the second defendant sold the properties to the plaintiffs, first defendant became infuriated and, in the suit O.S. 44 of 1975, filed by him he applied for injunction, and, on the basis of the interim order passed thereon, trespassed into the entire property and came into possession. Even though Ex. A-3 decree has become final, first defendant has not surrendered the portion that belongs to the second defendant now claimed by plaintiffs. His possession is illegal and, therefore, the present suit is filed for declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to B and C schedule items, to have the same recovered from first defendant, with the alternative relief as stated above.

6. Defendants 4 and 5 are also impleaded in the suit as sons of the third defendant.

7. In the written statement filed by the appellant, he said that the entire A Schedule property belonged to one Adaikkammal and on her death, the same was inherited by her two daughters Pappammal and Sevanthayee. Both were entitled to equal share. The third defendant purchased the share of Pappammal on 1.12.1948. The second defendant claimed the remaining half belonging to Sevanthayee by virtue of an adoption deed dated 20.1.1956. It was never a family property of the third defendant. The third defendant entered into an agreement for sale with the first defendant agreeing to sell the entire A Schedule. This Court has held that the third defendant has no authority to sell the property belonging to the second defendant since he is neither an agent nor has he acted as manager of family. In that case, both parties were under the impression that the second defendant is an adopted son of Sevanthayee.

8. Sevanthayee had four daughters, namely, Palaniyayi Ammal, Vellai Ammal, Achi Ammal and Chinnammal. All the four daughters inherited one-fourth share in the property. Of the four daughters, Palaniyayee Ammal and Vellai A
















































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