The burden of proving the date of execution of a document lies on the person claiming under the document, especially when the execution is challenged.

1. In Second Appeal No. 161 of 1990, first defendant in O.S. No. 722 of 1980, on the file of the District Munsifs Court, Tindivanam, is the appellant. In Second Appeal No. 446 of 1996 the sole defendant in C.S. No. 905 of 1987, who happens to be the first defendant in the earlier suit is the appellant. Plaintiff in both the suits is one and the same. Decision in S.A. No. 161 of 1990 will have bearing on S.A. No. 446 of 1996. Hence even though both the suits were not jointly tried, with the consent of parties, both the Second Appeals were heard together.

2. Defendants 2 and 3 in O.S. No. 722 of 1980 were the owners of the plaint property and as per Ex. A-1 dated 4-8-1979, plaintiff purchased the same from them. It is alleged by the appellant that defendants 2 and 3 have sold the property to him on 11-7-1979 as evidenced by Ex. B-3 in this case. The question that has to be decided is, which is the valid document which confers title over the plaint property. Both the courts below have held that the plaintiff who purchased the property on 4-8-1979 as evidenced by Ex. A-1 is the owner. There is a mortgage outstanding in the property and the mortgagee is none other than the appellant. The subsequent suit was filed by the plaintiff which has given rise to the other Second Appeal, namely, S.A. No. 446 of 1996. wherein the courts below have allowed redemption. There also, the only question is, whether the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff is valid or not.

3. Admittedly, defendants 2 and 3 are owners of the properly. It is also not in dispute that they have executed Ex. A-1 in favour of the plaintiff. So, the genuineness of Ex. A-1 is not in doubt. The execution of the document and the registration are on the same date, namely, 4-8-1979. It is said that subsequent to the purchase, a notice was issued to the defendant as evidenced by Ex. A-3 for which a reply was sent under Ex. A-4 wherein an allegation was made that they have purchased the property. The suit O.S. No. 722 of 1980 was, therefore, filed by the plaintiff for declaration of title.

4. In the written statement filed by the appellant, he contended that he has purchased the property as early as on 11-7-1979 even though the same was registered long thereafter. According to him, the registration after 81 days after execution of documents relates back to the date of execution and, therefore, title must be deemed to have vested in him on 11-7-1979. He, therefore, contends that the plaintiff has no title to the property, and he is the absolute owner.

5. The trial court, after taking evidence, both oral and documentary, came to the conclusion that the appellant has not proved the execution of Ex. B-3 on 11-7-1979 and, therefore, he may not have a valid title as against the plaintiff. The concurrent finding is challenged in these Appeals.

6. In Second Appeal No. 161 of 1990, the following substantial questions of law have been raised for consideration:—

1. Whether any explanation is necessary for the period between the date of execution and registration when the document is registered within the period fixed from the date of execution as provided by Section 23 of the Registration Act? and

2. Had not the registered document Ex. B-4 commenced to operate from the time of its execution dated 11-7-1979 and not from the time of its registration dated 27-10-79 by reason of Section 47 of the Registration Act?

7. Under Section 47 of the Indian Registration Act, if a document is registered within the time allowed by law, it shall operate from the time it would have commenced to operate. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that in view of the deeming provision under Section 47 of the said Act, he becomes the absolute owner with effect from 11-7-1979.

8. Even though the document purports to have been executed on 11-7-1979, it is seen that it has been registered only on 27-10-1979. In the meanwhile Ex. A-1 has come into existence, i.e., sale deed in favour of the plaintiff on