SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

1996 Supreme(Mad) 803

High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE AR. LAKSHMANAN
Subramanian & Others
Versus
Union of India, rep. by Chief Secretary, Govt. of Union Territory of Pondicherry & Others
S.A. No. 658 of 1996
Decided On :Decided On : 08-08-1996

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellants:Mrs. N. Krishnaveni, Advocate.
For the Respondents:R1 to R3 - P. Krishnamoorthy, Government. Pleader, R4 - S. Jothiraman, Advocates.

Section 26 of the Pondicherry Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1972, is mandatory and no suit or other legal proceedings by any Board can be filed or commenced before any Court without the previous sanction of the Government.

Headnote:

HINDU RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS ACT - SECTION 26 - SUIT BY BOARD OF TRUSTEES - PRIOR SANCTION OF GOVERNMENT - MANDATORY - NO SUIT MAINTAINABLE WITHOUT PRIOR SANCTION.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiffs, claiming to be members of the Board of Trustees of a temple, filed a suit for a declaration that they were entitled to continue as such and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their management of the temple. The defendants contended that the suit was not maintainable under Section 26 of the Pondicherry Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1972, as the plaintiffs had not obtained prior sanction from the Government to file the suit.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that Section 26 of the Act was mandatory and that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiffs had not obtained prior sanction from the Government. The court also held that the plaintiffs' claim that they were filing the suit in their individual capacity was not tenable as they had specifically claimed in the plaint that they were members of the Board of Trustees.

Issues: 1. Whether the suit was maintainable under Section 26 of the Pondicherry Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1972, without prior sanction from the Government. 2. Whether the plaintiffs were filing the suit in their individual capacity or as members of the Board of Trustees.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that Section 26 of the Act was mandatory and that no suit or other legal proceedings by any Board could be filed or commenced before any Court without the previous sanction of the Government. The court also held that the plaintiffs' claim that they were filing the suit in their individual capacity was not tenable as they had specifically claimed in the plaint that they were members of the Board of Trustees.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and held that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiffs had not obtained prior sanction from the Government.

Judgment :-

1. This Second Appeal is admitted and the following substantial questions of law arose for consideration:—

“a) When the plaintiffs had brought the action in their individual capacity for a declaration that the order passed by the 3rd respondent appointing the 4th respondent as Special Officer, is the learned Principal District Judge right in holding that the plaintiffs had filed the suit in the capacity as members of the Board of Trustees and they ought to have taken the permission of the Government before proceeding to initiate the proceedings?

b) When the plaintiffs had prayed that a declaration be made entitling them to continue as members of the Board of Trustees, is the learned Principal District Judge right in construing the same to mean that the suit was filed as members of the Board of trustees and the same was hit by Sec. 26 of the Pondicherry Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1972?”

2. By consent of both the sides, the main Second Appeal itself is taken up for final hearing.

3. Heard Mrs. N. Krishnaveni, learned counsel for the appellants Mr. P. Krishnamoorthy, learned Government Pleader, appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Mr. S. Jothiraman, learned Counsel for the fourth respondent.

4. The above Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 29.11.1995 made in A.S. No. 131/94 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Pondicherry, reversing the judgment and decree dated 18.7.1994 made in O.S. No. 798/93 on the file of the I Additional District Munsif, Pondicherry. The plaintiffs are the appellants in this Second Appeal. The respondent No. 1 is the Union of India and the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are the authorities of the Hindu Religious Institutions and the respondent No. 4 is the Special Officer appointed in the place of the appellants.

5. The appellants filed the suit for the following reliefs:—

“i) to declare that they are entitled to continue in the capacity of the members of the Board of Trustees of Shri Muthuvinayagar, Sri Subramania Samy, Sri Nagamuthu Mariamman Devasthanam of Saram, Pondicherry;

ii) to declare that the order said to have been passed by defendant No. 3 on behalf of 1st and 2nd defendants dated 5.3.1993 appointing fourth defendantas Special Officer of the abovesaid temples is void abinitio and inoperative;

iii) to grant permanent injunction restraining the defendants from, in any way, interfering with the management and administration of the above temples, together with costs”.

6. The appellants averred that they along with one Annamalai Pillai were appointed as members of the Board of Trustees of the temples in question, by virtue of G.O. Ms. No. 67/CHRI/TI/87 dated 28th August 1987, which was notified in the Gazette No. 44, dated 5.11.1987. They were functioning in such capacity. When Annamalai Pillai, who was the nominated as President of the Board, resigned from the said post, the first plaintiff, who was the Vice-President, was given charge of the post of President as per order dated 11.12.1987 of the third respondent. The plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 4 were respectively, Secretary, Treasurer and Member of the Board of Trustees. The tenure of office ended on 19.8.1990. However, they were allowed to hold the office for a further period of three years. According to the appellants, the third respondent gave an oral assurance that they would be allowed to continue in office. However, the third respondent, contrary to the oral promise, issued an order on 5.3.1993 that the fourth respondent/fourth defendant was appointed as Special Officer to take over from them in view of the expiry of the tenure of the Board on 19.8.1990. It is contended that the respondents are barred from issuing that order. When the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 seek to disturb the possession, the appellants filed the suit in the lower court.

7. The third defendant filed a written statement, which was adopted by the first, second and fourth defendants. A preliminary objection was raised stating that the



























Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top