1. The petitioner who was a minor on 5.12.1989 was travelling along with his father and mother in their car and proceeding towards Tirupathi. The car met with an accident at Pudur Village. While the petitioner and his father sustained injuries, the mother died. The petitioners father filed three claim petitions. First one for injuries on the minor, second one for injuries on himself and the third one for the death of his wife. The said claim petitions were filed on 11.1.1991 beyond the period of limitation of one year as provided under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and hence in M.C.O.P.SR.Nos.337, 339 and 341 the petitioners father had also filed petitions under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing the claim petition. The Tribunal dismissed the petition namely, I.A.Nos.337, 338 and 339 of 1991 on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 beyond the prescribed period. Three Revision Petitions were filed before this Court and the same were dismissed by this Court on 6.7.1992. No further steps were taken before the Supreme Court and hence those proceedings became final.

2. Subsequently, Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was amended with effect from 14.11.1994 deleting the period of limitation. In Dhannalal v. D.P.Vijayvargiya, 1996 (2) CTC 143 : 1996 A.C.J. 1013, the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the scope of the amendment and it was held that the benefit of deletion of the limitation should be available to all cases which were pending as on the date, considering the beneficial object behind the amendment.

3. The petitioner attained majority on 10.12.1992. He filed M.C.O.P.SR.No.4129 of 1993 claiming compensation for the injuries sustained by him and M.C.O.P.SR.No.4266 of 1993 for compensation for the death of his mother. Though learned counsel for the petitioner states that they were filed on 18.5.1993 and according to learned counsel for the respondent on 31.3.1994, a perusal of the records shows that they were filed on 7.6.1993, the petitioner also filed I.A.SR.No.4131 and 4170 of 1993 respectively under Section 6 of the Limitation Act praying for taking up the claim petition file contending that the delay in filing the claim petition was caused by his father and that for mistake of his father, the petitioner had suffered loss.

4. By order dated 15.11.1994, the Tribunal rejected both the claim petitions after holding that the minor had not produced any document to show that he was a minor as on the date of the accident and that the claim petition filed by his father having been already rejected, the petitioner cannot file one more petition and for a single claim there cannot be two different periods of limitation. Hence, the above revision petition.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends as follows:-

(1) Section 6 of the Limitation Act enables the petitioner to institute proceedings after attaining majority.

(2) The failure on the part of the father in not filing the claim petition was due to his own negligence for which the minor cannot be penalised. The failure to agitate the matter further before the Supreme Court was a further act of negligence on the part of the father of the petitioner.

(3) The petitioner is also entitled to the benefit of the interpretation of the Supreme Court as regards the amendment which was carried out to Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 holding that the benefit would be available to pending proceedings also. The rejection of the petitions having been ordered on 15.11.1996 only the petition should be treated as pending when the judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered namely, on 7.5.1996.

(4) The plea of res judicata will not be available to the present case considering that the petitioner had invoked Section 6 of the Limitation Act.

6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents contends that Section 6 of the Limitation Act cannot