For availing protection u/s 53-A filing of suit for specific performance is not a bar.

The appellant is the plaintiff who has not succeeded in obtaining an interim injunction against the respondents restraining them from disturbing his peaceful possession. According to the appellant, he was a tenant in respect of ‘A’ schedule A property under an agreement dated 6.7.1981 from one Baalamirtham (‘B’). She is the mother of the 1st respondent. The appellant was paying an advance of Rs.1,000. The lease deed permitted him to put up super-structure and the appellant also did so. Thereafter, in a family arrangement of ‘B’ and her family members, this property was allotted to the 1st respondent. The rent was paid to ‘B’ alone who received it. An un-registered lease deed was prepared in 1984, but since the signature of the 1st respondent was not obtained, the appellant continued to pay the rent to ‘B’. On 19.4.1989, ‘B’ offered the ‘A’ schedule property for sale. The sale consideration was also fixed. An agreement of sale was prepared on stamp paper and shown to ‘B’ and the 1st respondent and an advance of Rs.50,000 was paid. The 1st respondent did not comply with the terms and conditions of the sale agreement. The appellant is already in possession of the plaint schedule property pursuant to the agreement and entitled to protection of Sec.53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. Now, the appellant learns that desirous of getting a higher price of the properties, the 1st respondent executed two registered sale deeds in favour of the 2nd respondent on 11.12.1992. These sale deeds are not binding on the appellant. On 12.10.1995, the 2nd respondent filed R.C.O.P. No.110 of 1995 for eviction on the ground of wilful default and owners occupation. The eviction petition was dismissed, but the appellate authority allowed the appeal and ordered eviction. This order was confirmed by this Court in C.R.P.No.3949 of 1999. The S.L.P. was also dismissed by the Supreme Court with an observation “The S.L.P. is dismissed without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner to seek his remedy if advised through a suit”. Therefore, the appellant filed the present suit out of which this appeal arises.

2. This suit O.S.No.84 of 2001 is for a declaration that the registered sale deeds executed by the 1st respondent in favour of the 2nd respondent are null and void and for a declaration that the appellant is the absolute owner, and for permanent injunction, and pending suit, he prayed for interim injunction. The 2nd respondent resisted the prayer for injunction on the ground that the agreement on which the appellant bases his right is itself fabricated. Having lost in the rent control proceedings up to the Supreme Court, the appellant cannot avoid the execution of the lawfully obtained decree for eviction against him. As the most, the appellant can seek specific performance of the agreement. He is not entitled to the discretionary relief of injunction.

3. The learned Additional Sub Judge, Pondicherry vacated the injunction. Against that, the present C.M.A. had been filed. Pending C.M.A., an interim order was prayed for. Since the question to be considered in the C.M.P. and the C.M.A. is one and the same, by mutual agreement, the main C.M.A. itself was taken up.

4. Mr.M.Venkatachalapathy, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that pursuant to the agreement between the appellant and the original owner of the property, he had put up construction with a very heavy cost and has been in possession from 1968. According to the learned senior counsel, the only factor which appears to have prevailed upon the Court below is that this is the second round of litigation. Learned senior counsel would submit that the Court below ought to have considered the prima facie case, the balance of convenience and irreparable injury. Regardless of whether it is a second round of litigation, if these factors exist, interim injunction ought to have been granted. Learned senior counsel also submitted that it is irrelevant that the appellant had no