The main legal point established in the judgment is that the court's power to extend time under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure is contingent upon the court being in seisin of the matter and not having become functus officio.

1. This revision petition is directed against the order dated 21.6.2000 passed in unnumbered I.A.No.of 2000 in O.S. No. 389 of 1998 (C.R.19. Register No. 1348, dt. 31.1.2000) by the learned Principal District Munsif, Kumbakonam.

2. Learned District Munsif by the impugned order has dismissed the application filed by the petitioner herein for the grant of extension of time for payment of costs awarded in I.A. No. 1056 of 1999 for a period of four weeks from 3.1.2000. Learned District Munsif found that the suit O.S. No. 380 of 1998 was decreed ex parte and the petition, I.A. No. 1056 of 1999 was filed to set aside the ex parte decree and that petition was ordered on condition that the petitioner should pay to the respondent in I.A. No. 1056 of 1999 a sum of Rs. 250/- as costs on or before 3.1.2000. In I.A. No. 1056 of 1999, the learned District Munsif has ordered that on payment of Rs. 250/- on or before 3.1.2000, the petition would be allowed and on failure to pay the money, the petition would be dismissed. The above order was passed on 21.12.1999. The learned District Munsif also directed the matter to be posted on 4.1.2000. On 4.1.2000, the learned District Munsif found that the cost, as ordered, was not paid and there was no representation for the petitioner therein and hence, he dismissed the petition I.A. No. 1056 of 1999. This order, as already observed by me, was passed on 4.1.2000 and that order has become final.

3. Subsequent to that, an unnumbered I.A. was filed by the petitioner for the extension of time for payment of costs awarded in I.A. No. 1056 of 1999 for a period of four weeks. Learned District Munsif was of the view that the petition, I.A. No. 1056 of 1999 was dismissed for default of payment of conditional costs and the application seeking extension of time for payment was filed after the dismissal of I.A. No. 1056 of 1999 and hence, he held that such an application is not maintainable. In this view of the matter, learned District Munsif rejected the application, unnumbered I.A. and it is against that order, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued that learned District Munsif was not correct in dismissing the application as not maintainable. Learned counsel referred to Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure and submitted that the Court has the power to enlarge the time fixed or granted by the Court from time to time. Learned counsel submitted that the Court has the power to enlarge the period even though the period fixed or granted has expired. Learned counsel submitted that the provisions of Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be so construed to advance the course of justice. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned District Munsif should not have construed the provision so strictly so as to defeat the course of justice. Learned counsel submitted that the learned District Munsif should not have gone into the question when the application was filed by the petitioner for extension of time. Learned counsel submitted that the Court has the power to extend time at any time. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the default of the petitioner was bona fide, the provisions of Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be liberally construed for the enlargement of time earlier fixed by the Court.

5. Learned counsel referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 882) and submitted that Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be construed liberally and the Section can be invoked by the applicant at any time even though the time fixed by the Court has expired. Learned counsel submitted that the Supreme Court has held that Section 148 clothes the Court with ample power to do justice if there is sufficient cause for extension of time. Learned counsel also referred to the following observation made by the Supreme Cou