The central legal point established in the judgment is that a statutory provision nullifying a specific performance transaction prevails over the plaintiff's claim for specific performance.

1. This First Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, in O.S. No. 141 of 1980. The plaintiff in the suit is the appellant herein. The respondents originally arrayed in the First Appeal were defendants in the suit. Some of them died pending the Appeal and their legal representatives have been brought on record. The plaintiff wanted specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 29.6.1978, marked in the case as Ex. B 3 and the plaintiff is the second assignee of that agreement. The Court below non-suited the plaintiff mainly on the ground that the agreement of sale was cancelled by the original agreement holders. This finding is being put in issue in this First Appeal. Here is another way of enforcing the agreement of sale. In the Judgment of the court below, there is a reference to this aspect, but that has not appeal. Here is another way of enforcing the agreement of sale. In the Judgment of the court below, there is a reference to this aspect, but that has not been strictly put against the plaintiff. The impediment is that the transaction, assuming it could fructify through the hands of the Court, will come within the mischief of section 6 of Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 24 of 1978, hereinafter referred to as the Act. That provision inhibits the coming into existence of any such transaction as the present one and further says that such transaction will be null and void. The court is not supposed to lend its hands for the purpose of arriving at this result, assuming that the plaintiff has got a case on merits otherwise. As against the proceedings under the Act, the plaintiff did raise a voice before the authorities under the Act and her voice has been stiffled and she came to this court by way of W.P. No. 1967 of 1984 and today we have dismissed that writ petition.

2. The result is a decree for specific performance cannot be obtained at the hands of the Court, which will be practically nullifying the statutory provision, found in S. 6 of the Act. Keeping this in mind, we are obliged to dismiss the first appeal and accordingly we dismiss it; but, we make no order as to costs.