Condonation of delay of 31 days in filing revision.

1. This is a petition to excuse the delay of 31 days in the presentation of the civil revision petition filed under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter called “the Act”). According to the petitioner the order of the Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.20 of 1992 was made on 7.4.1993. The civil revision petition was filed on 5.6.1993. Though the petitioner says in the affidavit that there are only 30 days delay in filing the revision petition, after the office returns, he admits that the delay is 31 days in filing the revision petition. Lest there should be any doubt on this aspect of the case, I am giving below the calculation of the delay:

Date of Order on 7.4.1993 4 days (April)

Date of Application made on 12.4.1993 21 days (June)

Certified copy made ready on 9.6.1993 31 days (July)

C.R.P. filed on 5.8.1993 5 days (August)

2. The office note refers to certain earlier judgments of this Court on the interpretation of Sec.25(2) of the Act. The purport of these decisions is to the effect that the period of limitation provided under the Act is absolute and the delay if any, can be excused only upto a further period of one month and for a single day more. That proposition is not disputed before me but it is contended that one month comprises of 31 days. I, therefore, directed the miscellaneous petition to be numbered and ordered notice. The respondent has filed a counter-affidavit, stating that one month comprises of only 30 days.

3. This interesting question has been argued by both parties with reference to certain authorities. On behalf of the petitioner reliance is placed on Omkar v. Jagmohan Singh, A.I.R. 1982 Raj. 179. Interpreting 0.41, Rule 22 (1), Civil Procedure Code read with Secs.3(35) and 9 of the General Clauses Act, the court came to the conclusion that there was only ‘one month’ from 14.1.1981 to 13.2.1981 and the cross-objections were filed just in time. The court did not decide the issue whether ‘one month’ comprised of 30 days or 31 days. V.S.Mehta, In re. 1969 M.L.J. (Crl.) 538: A.I.R. 1970 A.P. 234: (1969)2 An.W.R. 2: 1970 Crl.LJ. 797: (1970)1 An.L.T. 98: 1970 Lab.I.C. 808, the question was whether three months referred to in Sec.106 of the Factories Act means three calendar months or 90 days calculated at the rate of 30 days per month. Referring to the General Clauses Act, the court held that the terms “within three months of the date” meant only three calendar months. To the same effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tamil Lahiri v. R.N.Tagore, (1979)1 S.C.C. 75. The period of six months in Sec.533-A of Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 was considered by the Apex Court and they referred to Bengal General Clauses Act and held that the expression “six months” must be construed to mean and as calendar months and not 180 days.

4. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents relied on the judgment of this Court in Varna Deva Desikar v. Murugesan Mudali, (1906) l.L.R. 29 Mad 75. Sec.40 of the Madras Rent Recovery Act prescribes that appeal by way of summary suit against an order of attachment should be filed within one month as per section 40 of the Act. This word ‘one month’ was construed as 30 days because of a subsequent section which used the word “30 days” in respect of summary suits.

5. I am of the opinion that the above decisions do not conclusively establish that the expression ‘month’ usually means a period of 30 days or a period of 31 days. The proper way to approach this question is to proceed from the General Clauses Act and since we are concerned with the word ‘month’ in Sec.25(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act, I will quote the definition of the word ‘month’ in the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act which is as follows:

“month shall mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar”.

I have already referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court where they say that the British Calendar means the calendar which was introduced in the year 1582 by Pope G