S. 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to proceedings before the Rent Controller or the appellate authority under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, as these authorities are persona designatae.

1. The tenant is the petitioner herein. The respondent filed R.C.O.P. 559 of 1971, on the file of the First Additional District Munsif (Rent Controller) Madurai, for eviction of the petitioner on the ground of wilful default in the payment of rent. The Rent Controller found that the petitioner herein has committed wilful default in the payment of rents and on that ground, ordered eviction, giving the petitioner herein three months time for vacating the premises, Aggrieved by the decision of the Rent Controller, the petitioner herein presented a civil miscellaneous appeal before the Subordinate Judge of Madurai. Since there was a delay of 16 days in preferring the said appeal against the order of eviction, the petitioner herein filed I.A. 353 of 1973 along with the said appeal, under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, to condone the delay in filing the appeal. Following the principles laid down by this court in the decision reported in Easwaran v. Palaniammal 1974 T.L.N. 380, to the effect that S. 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by the Rent Controller and the Appellant authority under Act 18 of 1960, since they are not courts, but only personae designatae , the Subordinate Judges dismissed the application. Aggrieved by the said decision of the Subordinate Judge, the tenant has preferred this revision petition.

2. The only question that has to be decided in this civil revision petition is whether S. 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable for condoning the delay in preferring an appeal against the order of the Rent Controller.

3. Mr. K.J Chandran, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner herein, submitted that the Rent Controller, or, in any event, the appellate authority is not a personae designatae , but is a court. The learned counsel further contended that S. 5 of the Limitation Act read with S. 29(2) of the said Act clearly gives the power to the appellate authority to condone the delay in preferring the appeal. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, submitted that neither the Rent Controller nor the appellate authority can be construed as a court but they are only perscnae designatae and as such neither S. 5 for S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act will apply for condonation of the delay. Both the counsel cited number of decisions in support of their respective contention, which I will deal with presently.

4. Sub-S. (3) of S. 2 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960, as amended by Act 23 of 1973, defines ‘Controller’ as meaning:

“any person appointed by the Government, by notification, to exercise the powers of a Control lei under this Act for such area as may be specified in the notification.”

S. 23(1)(a) of the Act states;

“The Government may, by general or special order notified in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, confer or such officers and authorities for the purposes of this Act, in such areas and in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order.”

S. 23(1)(b) states:

“Any parson aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may, within 15 days from the date of such order prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. In computing the 15 days aforesaid the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded.”

Dealing with more or less identical provisions in the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (2 of 1965), a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court opined in Fernandez v. Umma A.I.R. 1974 Ker. 162 (F.B.), that the appellate authority is a persona designata and as such neither S. 5 nor S. 5 read with S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, will apply for condoning delay in filing appeals.

The Full Bench observed:—

“Even if the power under S. 5 were to be read into special local law by reason of the provisions of S. 29 of the Limitation Act, that power is exercisable only by courts and not by tribunals or other authorities such as the appellate authority in this case.”

In further dea