1. This appeal is against an order of remand in a suit, in which one of the questions was whether the defendant is a tenant entitled to the benefits of S. 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act, hereinafter referred to as the percent Act. The trial court held, on the basis of a particular covenant in the written lease agreement that the proviso to S. 12 of the Parent Act would apply, and that, there, fore, he was not entitled to the benefits of S. 9 thereof. So, a decree for possession was granted. The landlord had asked for arrears of rent also. That also had been decreed by trial court.

2. When the appeal filed by the tenant was before the first appellate court. Act 4 of 1972 had come into force and that Act had deleted the proviso to S. 12. That meant, that in spite of the covenant in the lease deed, the tenant was entitled to file an application under 5.9 of the Patent Act. However, the application had been filed by the tenant in the trial court only after a delay of 60 days. It had been contended before the first appellate court, on behalf of the landlord, that such delay cannot be excused, because S. 5 of the imitation Act has no application. The contention was that