Section 10 of the Act bars execution of the title.

1. The first defendant in O.S. No. 26 of 1971, District Munsifs Court, Mahe, is the petitioner in this civil revision petition. The first respondent herein instituted a suit in ejectment against the petitioner and the second respondent herein in respect of a non-residential building situate at Mahe after giving a notice of termination of tenancy. It was pleaded that the tenant petitioner herein had committed wilful default in the payment of rents and also sublet the premises without obtaining her consent . The trial Court decreed the suit on 31st May, 1972, and an appeal against that, at the instance of the petitioner, proved unsuccessful on 17th November, 1973. Thereupon, the petitioner preferred a second appeal to this Court in S.A. No. 1389 of 1974— Total Menthamma, Naidu v. Smt. Kottikollam Edavalath Nabeesa. which was disposed of on 7th November 1977. In the course of the second appeal, a contention was put forth on behalf of the petitioner that consequent to the coming into force of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969, hereinafter referred to as the Act, effective from 17th October, 1972 in the town of Mahe, the suit instituted by the first respondent is barred tinder S. 10 of the Act and that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree in ejectment. That contention was negatived and the suit was held to be maintainable. However, the question whether reliance can be placed on the provisions of the Act was left open to the stage of execution of the decree. Thereafter, the first respondent herein filed E.P. No. 5 of 1978 before the District Munsif, Mahe, praying for recovery of possession of the property on the basis of the decree in O.S. No. 26 of 1971 dated 31st May, 1972. That application was resisted by the petitioner herein on the ground that the petitioner could not be evicted from the property in question in view of the extension of the Act to Mahe on and from 17th October, 1972, and therefore under S. 10 (1) of the Act, a decree in ejectment could not be executed. The executing Court held that the provisions of the Act do not contemplate that decrees passed even before the coming into force of that Act should not be executed, and therefore, there was no bar to the executability of the decree passed against the petitioner in O.S. No. 26 of 1971. On this finding, the learned District Munsif ordered delivery.

2. In this civil revision petition, the question that arises for consideration is whether the order of the executing Court is correct. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that having regard to the provisions of S. 10 of the Act, it is not open to the first respendent to execute the decree and seek an order for delivery of possession of the property against the petitioner amounting to the eviction of the petitioner from the premises in question. On the other hand the learned counsel for the first respondent contends that the petitioner had ceased to be a tenant after the termination of the tenancy in his favour and after passing of a decree in ejectment and therefore, on the date when the provisions of the Act were extended to Mahe, the petitioner was not a tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act and could not therefore call in aid S. 10 of the Act. The further submission of the learned counsel for the first respondent is that the twin grounds on the basis of which a decree in ejectment was sought against the petitioner, viz., wilful default and subletting were found in favour of the first respondent, and therefore, there could really be no objection to the decree being executed, because they are also grounds which could be relied upon in an application under S. 10 of the Act and it would only be a technicality to say that an order for eviction under the Act should be obtained again on the same grounds. Before proceeding to consider these rival contentions, it is necessary to set out certain facts about which there is no controversy. The suit in ejectment