1979 Supreme(Mad) 385
High Court of Judicature at Madras
ISMAIL & SENGOTTUVELAN
Suryaprakash Gupta & Others
Versus
The Madras Piece-goods Merchants Charitable Trust
O.S.A. No. 90 of 1976
Decided On :Decided on: 23-08-1979
For the Appellants:K. Parasaran for S. Rojaram, Advocates.
For the Respondents:A.N. Rangaswami, Advocate.
Dismissal of execution petition.
Headnote:Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, I960-Section 30 r/w G. O. No. 1998 dated 12.08.1974-Suit for recovery of possession of building-Decree on the basis of compromise-Dismissal of execution petition-Fresh execution petition filed.
ISMAIL, J.
1. This is an appeal against the order of N. S. Ramaswami, J. dt. 20th July, 1976 made in Appln. No. 3419 of 1975 in E.P 11 of 1975 in C.S. No. 163 of 1962. The facts lie within a very narrow compass and they art not in controversy. The appellants are the tenants and the respondent herein is the landlord. C.S. 163 of 1962 was instituted by the respondent herein for recovery of possession of the suit properly from the first defendant, whose legal representatives are the appellants herein, and in that suit a decree for recovery of possession was passed in 1963 on the basis of a compromise entered into between the parties. At the time when the suit was instituted and the decree was passed, the building in question was outside the scope of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960) hereinafter referred to as the Act, ( sic ) by virtue of the provisions contained in the Act shall apply to any non-residential building or part thereof occupied by any one tenant, if the monthly rent paid by him in respect of that building or part exceeds four hundred rupees, per mensem. Subsequently the Tamil Nadu Act 11 of 1964 was passed deleting S. 30(iii) from the principal Act. Meanwhile the respondent herein filed E.P. No. 35 of 1974 for delivery of possession. But, that execution petition was ultimately dismissed by order, dt. 31st Jul y, 1974 made in O.S.A. 93 of 1966, on the ground that by virtue of the amending Act 11 of 1964, the decree could not be executed. Thereafter the Government passed an order in G.O.Ms. No. 1998, Home, dt. 12th August, 1974, in exercise of its powers under S. 29 of the Act. By this order, the Government exempted “all the buildings owned by Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious Trusts and Charitable institutions” from all the provisions of the Act. After the issue of this Government Order, the respondent he rein filed the present execution petition, namely. E.P. No. 11 of 1975, for recovery of posses lion of the property. When the execution petition came up before the Master of this Court, the Master dismissed the same holding that the said Government Order would not cover the case of the respondent herein. Against the order of the Master the respondent preferred an appeal before the court and it was that appeal which was disposed of by N. S. Ramaswami, J. by the impugned order, The learned Judge allowed the appeal holding that the Government order in question applied to the case of the respondent herein and that S. 3 of the amending Act 11 of 1964 did not nullify the decree as such and it merely suspended the excitability of the decree during the period when the building in question was within the purview of the Act. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed.
2. Before us the two grounds on which the learned Judge allowed the appeal against the order of the Master were challenged—the first ground on the basis of the construction of the Government Order referred to above and the second on the construction of S. 3 of the amending Act 11 of 1964.
3. As far as the first ground is concerned, the contention that would appear to have been put forward before the learned Judge was that the expressions ‘Hindu, Christian and Muslim’ occurring in the G.O, referred to above qualified not only the religious trusts but also the charitable institutions and that in the present case the respondent herein not being a Hindu, Christian or a Muslim charitable institution, the said GO. would not apply. This contention of the appellants was repelled by the learned Judge by pointing out that the religions of Hinduism, Christianity and Islam would be relevant with regard to the expression ‘religious trusts’ and would have no relevancy to the expression ‘charitable institutions and that therefore the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants was not valid. The learned Judge pointed put—
The reasoning for holding that the exemption is not available to th