Applicability of the provisions of first proviso of Section 6(1) of the Act.

NATARAJAN, J.

1. The question referred to the Full Bench is whether the fundamental principles actus curiae neminum gravabit (an act of a Court shall prejudice no man) and actus legis nemini est damnosus (an act in law shall prejudice no man) will have application in construing the time-limit prescribed in the first proviso to S. 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, limiting thereunder the period for declaration to three years from the date of the notification under S. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

2. For an appreciation of the question, it is necessary to set out the facts of the case. On 25th June 1969, a notification under S. 4(1) of the Act was made by the second respondent herein notifying the intention of the Government to acquire a certain extent of land in Nanjanapuram Village, Erode Taluk, Coimbatore District comprised in the Survey Numbers mentioned in the notification, for the purpose of providing house sites to Harijans. Among the items of land notified was an extent of 1.17 acres in Survey No. 48/1 belonging to the petitioners herein. The enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act was held on 10th February, 1970 and then followed a declaration of the Government under S 6(1) of the Act by Gazette Notification, dated 27th May, 1970 declaring that the lands were required for a public purpose.

3. The petitioners filed Writ Petition No. 2544 of 1970 on or about 16th August, 1970, to challenge the validity of the declaration. Palaniswami, J, held that there was no valid service of notice regarding the enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act and, therefore, the enquiry under S. 5-A was vitiated and the declaration under S. 6 that followed was also vitiated. Consequently, by order, dt. 3rd November, 1971, the learned Judge allowed the writ petition and held that “the enquiry proceedings and the declaration under S. 6 (1) have to be quashed without prejudice to the respondent continuing the proceedings in accordance with law, if so advised.”

4. In view of this order, a fresh enquiry, after notices were served on the petitioners, under S. 5-A was held on 2nd June, 1972. Thereafter, a declaration under S. 6 was again made by the Government on 26th September, 1972 and the declaration was published in the Gazette dated 11th October, 1972. Then followed the award enquiry and the passing of the award on 16thjuly 1974. It was thereafter, the petitioners filed the present writ petition contending that in as much as the declaration under S. 6 (1) had been made beyond a period of three years from the date of the notification under S. 4(1) of the Act, the declaration was out of time as it was not in accordance with the first proviso to S. 6 (1) of the Act and, therefore, the declaration should be quashed by means of a writ of certiorari.

5. When the petition came up for hearing before Mohan, J. the petitioners relied on an order of a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1418 of 1972 1 where it was held that the first proviso to S. 6 (1) was unequivocal in its terms and therefore, any declaration under S. 6 (1) made after a period of three years from the date of the notification under S. 4 (1), whatever may be the reason for the delay, will automatically attract the interdiction contained in the proviso. In so rendering its decision, the Bench overruled the decision of Ismail, J. in Writ Petion No, 642/1969 and the order of Alagiriswami, J. (as he then was) in Writ Petition Nos. 2397 to 2399 of 1966, wherein the view taken was that the general principles that the pendency of proceedings before a Court cannot operate to the prejudice of parties, will come into operation so that the period for which the acquisition proceedings remained stayed under an order of the Court would be excluded for the purpose of determining the period of three years mentioned in the first proviso to S. 6(1). On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the Government before Mohan, J. that the fundamental principl