An oral relinquishment of interest in immovable property is not valid.

1. The only point that arises for consideration in this second appeal is, whether the relinquishment that is Headed, can be held to be substantiated by oral evidence alone or the same should be in a written document, so as to take the said allegation regarding the relinquishment as the basis for a plea that had been actually put forward by the defendants in the suit.

2. In this regard, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant before me is that the principle imbedded in the ratio decidendi of the decision of the Supreme Court in S.S.A. Gulam Ghouse v. S.S.A. Kumisul 1 has been completely overlooked by the lower appellate court in reversing the judgment of the trial court. The learned counsel for the appellant points out that the lower appellate court has not given any convincine reasons for reversing the judgments of the trial court and the observation of the lower appellate court that the learned District Munsif declined to give proper weight to the evidence put forward by the plaintiff while disbelieving the relinquishment, is unsustainable, without proper, adequat e, sufficient and convincing reasons and it makes the judgment emanating from him as the subject-matter of issue under the provisions of S. 100, C.P.C. by this Court. The substantial question of law as a matter of fact that was framed at the time of admission of this second-appeal reads as follows—

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the finding of the lower appellate court that there was a relinquishment of the plaintiffs interest in the suit properties is sustainable?

3. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand contends that a reading of S. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act together with S. 17 (1) (c) of the Registration Act, 1903, will show that there can also be an oral relinquishment, in spite of the fact that S. 17 (1) is to the effect that the document, which contains a clause regarding extinction of any right, title or interest should be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a District in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act. 1856, or the Indian Registration Act. 1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877 or this Act came or comes into force. As a matter of (act, Mr. Sarvabhauman, in his interesting and thought provoking argument, referred to two decisions, in which the celebrity judgment of the Privy Counsil in Varadi Pillai v. Jeevarathna Ammal, 2 had been dealt with and that is the decision in Karnam Kandasami Pillai v. Chinnabha 3 It is relevant in this connection to note that this decision relied on by Mr. Sarvabhauman as well as the decision of the Privy Council in Varadi Pillai v. Jeevarathna Ammal 2 relate to mortgages. In the instant case, it is the transaction of a Sale, which is evidenced by Ex.A1. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant herein that there has been nothing available on any one of the documents that is relied on by the defendants to show that there has been an oral relinquishment with regard to the right, title or interest, the plaintiff is now seeking to enforce.

4. It is common ground that the property in question was purchased subsequent to a partition that had taken place in the joint family consisting of the plaintiff and the defendants. The said partition took place about 40 years prior to the coming into existence of this document, Ex.A1 It is also common ground that the property in question is in possession of the son of the first defendant, namely, the 2nd defendant, who figures as D.W. 4 in the suit. As already stated, at one point of time, this D.W.4 states in his evidence in cross examination that there has been no oral relinquishment. Relying on the above said portion in his evidence, emanating from D.W. 4, the learned counsel for the appellant states that there has been no point made out with respect to an oral relinquishment an