Requirement of issuance of notice under Section 176 of the Act.

1. The point that arises in this second appeal is: Whether the sale held by the pawnee of the jewelleries pledged is not valid? The plaintiff is the appellant herein. He filed the suit for redemption of the jewels pledged with the defendant or in the alternative for a decree against the defendant for a sum of Rs. 91,200, being the value of the jewels with interest thereon. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court (V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras) and the appeal filed by the plaintiff also was dismissed by the first appellate Court (VI Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras),

2. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff pledged with the defendant certain jewels. In this connection the plaintiff has pleaded certain facts regarding the actual amounts received, payments of discharge and execution of two mortgages etc., and the defendant has contended certain facts repudiating the allegations made by the plaintiff against him. We are now in this appeal not concerned with all the said facts and we are concerned only with the sale held by the defendant in which the pledged jewels were sold.

3. The jewels were sold in a sale held on 18-8-1972 for recovery of a sum of Rs. 38,025. 60 due under the pledges. (It is common case that different jewels were pledged under three pawn ticket Nos. 546 to 548). It appears the jeweis were sold for Rs. 38,124 and the balance amount after deducting the amount due to the defendant was, according to the defendant, paid to the plaintiff. But the plaintiff disputes the same. However, the courts below have found that there is no amount payable by the defendant to the plaintiff.

4. Now, Mr. M.S. Rosi Naidu, learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff contends that according to the plaintiff the pledged jewels had been sold under S. 176 of the Con tract Act but the requirements in that S. 176 of the Contract Act for a valid sale have not been satisfied and therefore the alleged sale is invalid. The learned counsel further argues that in fact there was no sale at all, but the Courts below have concurrently found that there was in fact a sale, and therefore this point cannot be argued now. The only thing that can be considered is whether there was no valid sale as per S. 176 of the Contract Act. As regards this point also I find no merit in the contention of the learned counsel. Ex. A24 is the sale notice. As per this the sale was to be held on 18-8-1972. It is not in dispute that this notice was ser ved on the plaintiff long prior to the sale i.e., on 26-7-1972 The relevant portion in S. 176 of the Contract Act reads thus:

“ Or he may sell the thing pledged, on giving the pawnor reasonable notice of the sale.”

The only requirement of S. 176 is that the pawnor should be given reasonable notice of the sale. In this case certainly it cannot be argued that notice of reasonable time has not been given. In fact this is not a point argued here or in the courts below. The learned counsel would however argue that the notice Ex. A24 is not signed by the pawnee or anybody else. But nowhere it is stated that a notice of sale must be signed by the pawnee or anybody on his behalf. The fact that Ex. A24 is a notice of sale sent by the defendant to the plaintiff is not disputed. In this notice the various jewels pledged by the plaintiff have been listed for sale. Therefore there is no merit in the point that the sale notice has not been signed.

5. It is next argued by the learned coun sel that first a separate notice ought to have been given intimating the plaintiff the am ount due from him and that the defendant proposed to have the sale. But S 176 is not to that effect at all. To repeat, what all the section says is that a reasonable notice of sale must be given to the pawnor, In this connection the learned counsel reads but three decisions viz., Srirama Finance Corporation, Bobbili, Srikakulam District— A partnership-firm by their Managing Partner Sri C. V. Seetharamaswamy v. Chatla Yellaiah Reddi