The condition imposed under S. 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Rent Control Act as per the words "not occupying a residential building of his own" is to be understood with reference to the person for whose benefit the building is required.

1. This Civii Revision Petition is againstthe concurrent order of eviction passedagainst the petitioner by the authoritiesbelow under the Rent Control Act on theground of respondent-landladys sons ownoccupation under S. 10(3) (a) (i) of the said Act.

2. It is in evidence that P.W.I, the said son of the landlady and his wife and children along with the said landlady are residing in a rented premises bearing Door No. 24, Murthuza Begumpettah Street, Madras-14.

3. One submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent has inherited the said premises bearing Door No. 24, Murthuza Begumpettah Street, Madras on the death of the landlady of the said premises (who is none other than the mother of the respondent) in 1983, after the R.C.O.P. was filed, and that since the respondent had thus come to own the said premises, which is now in her occupation, S. 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Rent Control Act cannot be invoked by the respondent. The sai d provision runs as follows:—

“A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building.

(i) in case it is a residential building, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned.”

According to the said Counsel, in the expression:—

“if he or any member of his family is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city,” the words ‘his own’.

would refer only to the landlady in the present case and not her son. But in very many decisions like Annamalai & Co. v. Sital Achi 1 Indian Plywood Manufacturing Co., Messrs. v. Balaramiah Chetty 2 , and Kaman, A.S. v. S.C.M. Zackriya 3 , this court has held that the condition imposed under the said Section as per the words not occupying a residential building of his own is to be understood with reference to the person for whose benefit the building is required. In Kannan, A.S. v. S.C.M. Zackeriya 3 , referred to above, this court obseryed as follows:—

“This court has uniformly held that when the premises are sought for by the landlord for the benefit of any member of his family it is only that member of the family for whose benefit the premises arc required who should not occupy premises of his or of her own. The fact that the landlord occupies premises of his own would not disentitle him from claiming eviction for the benefit of a member of his family, who does not occupy any premises of his own.”

In the said decision, the learned Judge also held, referring to the decision in Jagannatha Chettiar v. R.V. Swarnambal 4 , as follows:—

“A perusal of the judgment would clearly indicate that the facts in that case are totally different and that therefore, the view expressed by the learned Judge on those facts is really not in conflict with the laws expressed by this court in the other decisions, referred to above. In Jaganatha Chettiar, R.V. v. Swarnambal 4 , the landlord has initially sought eviction on the ground that he required the premises for his daughter. He had also claimed that neither himself nor his daughter was occupying any other building of their own. The tenant has resisted the eviction on the ground that the landlord was not living in rented premises, but the premises in which he was residing was his own. It is seen from the facts set out in the above judgment, that though initially the landlord has sought eviction for the benefit of his daughter, who did not have a house of her own, during evidence he had made it clear that eviction was sought for to enable him to go and live with his married daughter and son-in-law and that he could not do so in his house since the accommodation in the house, where he was residing, was not sufficient.”

Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard cannot be accepted. As the learned Judge who de