Provisions of S. 6 of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas Regulation Act 1955 and R. 41 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1957 were not unconstitutional and did not impose unreasonable restrictions on the petitioner's business.

1. The challenge in this writ petition is with reference to the constitutionality of S. 6 of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas Regulation Act 1955 and R. 41 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1957.

2. S. 6 of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Act in so far as it is relevant for the purpose of this case reads thus :—

“6(1) Power of Government to issue directions— The Government may, from time to time, issue directions to any licensee or to licensees generally, requiring the licensee or licensees to exhibit such films or class of films having a scientific or educative value, such films, dealing with news and current events, such documentary films, indigenous films, or such other films having special value to the public, as may have been approved by the Government in that behalf from time to time; and where any such directions have been issued, those directions shall be deemed to be additional conditions and restrictions subject to which the licence has been granted; provided that no direction issued under this section shall require the licensee to exhibit any such film or films exceeding two thousand feet at, or for more than one fifth of the entire time taken for any one show”

R.41 of the rules reads thus:—

“After obtaining the certificate referred to in R. 40, the applicant shall submit his application for licence in writing to the licensing authority. The application shall be accompanied by

(1) the certificates issued by the executive engineer and Chief Electoral inspector;

(2) a declaration by the applicant to the effect that he had completed all arrangements for obtaining films approved by the Stale Government under S. 6 of the Act and films certified by Central Government with the previous approval of the Central Film Advisory Board for exhibition at each performance together with a statement from the suppliers confirming that such arrangements have been made;

(3) a treasury receipt for the payment of fees for licence at the rates prescribed in R 43; and

(4) Evidence of having insured the cinema building, machinery etc., against fire hazards.”

3. The contention of the petitioner is that in view of the provisions of S. 6 and R. 41, the petitioner is made to obtain films approved by the State Government and films certified by the Central Government from the Films Division of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India for which the petitioner has to pay a fee every year. According to the petitioner, by compelling the petitioner to pay a fee to the Films Division, an unreasonable restriction has been imposed by the provisions of S 6 and R. 41 on the petitioner in carrying on his business. Hence, It is submitted that the provision in S 6 of the Act and R. 41 violates Art. 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution of India. I do not agree.

4. The section is intended for a particular purpose. While theatre owners exhibit films for the entertainment of the people, the Government intends that the theatre owners should also exhibit films of scientific or education value so that people may gain knowledge therefrom. Under the proviso the time for exhibition of scientific or educative films is restricted to one fifth of the total time and also to 2000 ft. Thus the restriction, if any, imposed by S. 6 is quite a reasonable one and for the good of t he people. That cannot be said to be in any manner unconstitutional. Just because the petitioner is made to pay an amount to the Films Division for getting ‘approved films’, his right to carry on business is not curtailed. It may, if at all, lead to a reduction in the profits earned by him, but it does not amount to an unreasonable restriction. If the grievance of the petitioner is that the fee charged by the Films Division is very high, the section or the rule cannot be invalidated.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Md. Yasin v. Town Area Committee Jalalabad 1. In that case, the question was, whether the imp